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I. INTRODUCTION
A hedge fund is most commonly described as "any pooled investment
vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional investment
managers, and not widely available to the public."' Hedge funds are sexy!
Their attractive "secret society' 2 mystique paired with the appeal of earning
lucrative amounts of absolute profit for wealthy, business savvy investors has
the securities industry (namely the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC")) and even the greater investing public shining their inquiring spotlight
directly toward these largely unregulated investment devices. 3 This attention
should come as no surprise to the advisers of hedge funds or their individual
investing "clients" 4 because of (1) the ever multiplying size of the hedge fund
industry, (2) the amount of assets hedge fund adviser's have under their control,
(3) the potential impact that hedge fund investments could have on the financial
markets in the United States, and (4) the recent calamities surrounding the disas-
trous financial losses suffered by an unregulated "high-end" hedge fund.5 To-
day, there are some 9,700 hedge funds operating in the United States, with
I Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999)). This definition may be the one most commonly used, but there
are many more. For a substantial listing of various hedge fund definitions, see SEC Roundtable
on Hedge Funds (May 13, 2003) (comments of David A. Vaughan), available at
www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm. Hedge funds, like mutual funds, are "en-
gaged in the business of issuing securities to investors and investing their assets into pools of
securities, which are managed by . . .[the hedge fund's] investment adviser." Jay Crenshaw,
Hedge Funds: Regulatory, Tax, and Organizational Considerations, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 359, 363
(2006). See infra Part II.
2 Hedge funds are investment devices utilized mostly by wealthy, sophisticated individuals
and institutions. Hedge funds have significant minimum investment requirements and are not
publicly advertised; therefore, a hedge fund can be aptly described as being a "secretive" invest-
ment opportunity not available to the general investing public. See infra Part II for a "founda-
tional" discussion of hedge funds and their "secretive" investing strategies.
3 For all intents and purposes a hedge fund and its adviser are exempted from SEC regulation
under the federal securities laws. See infra Part lI.C for a detailed explanation of how hedge
funds avoid, for the most part, SEC regulation.
4 We will see that a major point of contention in the hedge fund industry surrounds determin-
ing how to classify those individuals or institutions that actually invest their money in hedge
funds. For most securities advisers, such as those who advise mutual funds, those individuals or
institutions that invest are known as "clients;" however, in the world of hedge funds, those indi-
viduals or institutions that invest in a hedge fund are known simply as "investors" of the fund, not
the "clients" of the hedge fund's adviser. See infra Parts III.B & IV.
5 For a discussion of the multi-billion dollar losses suffered by the hedge fund Amaranth
Advisors, see infra Part V (B).
[Vol. 110
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roughly $1.7 trillion of assets invested in them. 6 These totals are higher than
those of only a few years ago,7 and they are considerably greater than estimates
of a decade before.8 Furthermore, due to hedge funds' "celebrity persona" with
the investing public, and with over 300 hedge fund advisers individually manag-
ing more than $1 billion in assets,9 hedge funds that fail to provide their inves-
tors with above market-rate returns, or actually lose billions of dollars of inves-
tor assets through bad or unduly risky investments, are being viewed by the SEC
with an increasingly more scrutinizing, but wholly non-regulating, lens.' 0
Unlike many of their investment counterparts, hedge fund investment
advisers are exempt from registering the hedge funds they advise with the SEC
under the framework and exemptions of the federal securities laws. Thus, hedge
fund advisers are not required to provide public financial disclosures, appropri-
ately inform investors of their trading strategies or current investment positions,
or subject themselves to SEC oversight and periodic examination. 1 However,
in 2004, a sharply divided SEC adopted a new regulation, known as the "hedge
fund rule,"'12 that redefined how a hedge fund adviser's clients were to be
counted. Ultimately, the hedge fund rule had the effect of requiring most hedge
fund advisers to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (the "IAA")13 and come under its regulatory supervision. Less than six
months after this "hedge fund rule" went into effect, 14 the United States Court of
6 Tom Petruno, A Closed Door Policy at Hedge Funds, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007. Just a little
over a year ago, these totals were 8,800 and $1.2 trillion respectively; therefore, the rapid growth
of the hedge fund industry continues to this day. See Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (July 25, 2006) (statement of
Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Cox Testimony]. See also Reuters, Money Still
Flowing Into Hedge Funds-Survey, July 23, 2007, available at www.reuters.com
/article/marketsnews/idukn2337385520070723?rpc=44 (in the first two fiscal quarters of 2007,
investors poured approximately $118.7 billion into the hedge fund industry).
7 Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 685 (2000)
(In 1998, there were only an estimated 3,000 hedge funds in business with $200-$300 billion in
capital invested in them).
8 Alex R. McClean, The Extraterritorial Implications of the SEC's New Rule Change To
Regulate Hedge Funds, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 105, 114 (2006) (In 1990, there were only
300 known hedge funds operating within the U.S. financial markets). See Reuters, supra note 6
(In 1990, these 300 hedge funds had only a "mere" $39 billion in assets invested in them.).
9 Anita Raghavan et a]., Despite Blue-Chip Gains, Hedge Funds Increasingly Are Faltering
and Closing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2006, at C4.
10 See infra Parts III & IV.
II See infra notes 23, 27 and accompanying text. See infra Part II.C for a detailed discussion
of how hedge fund investment advisers avoid having to register the hedge funds that they advise
under the federal securities laws.
12 Codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279 (2004). See infra Parts III, IV, and V.
13 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (2006). See infra Parts III, IV, and V.
14 SEC Final Rule, 1517 PLI/Corp 335, 360 (2005) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule] (hedge fund
advisers required to register with the IAA under the "hedge fund rule" had until Feb. 1, 2006 to
register with the SEC).
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Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the hedge fund rule in Goldstein v.
S.E.C.,' 5 holding that it was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the SEC's
regulatory power that was outside the scope of its own prior interpretation of the
IAA.16 With one quick blow Goldstein knocked the air out of the SEC's first
significant attempt to regulate hedge funds and their advisers-leaving a vac-
uum of uncertainty over whether, and to what extent, hedge fund regulation is
permissible to protect the U.S. financial markets and its investors. Two months
later the SEC, led by its new Chairman, Christopher Cox, declined to appeal the
Goldstein decision to the United States Supreme Court. 17 Less than four months
later a large, Connecticut based hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors, would lose, in
less than a month, over 60% of its total net assets ($6.5 billion of its investor's
money) and be forced to liquidate all of its remaining holdings due to brash
natural-gas investments that went sour in what has since been coined the "big-
gest ever hedge fund meltdown."18 Thus, after Goldstein and the sudden implo-
sion and hasty liquidation of Amaranth Advisors, the question remains: is there
a need for hedge fund regulation or would such regulation simply be arbitrary?
This Article will address the current state of hedge fund regulation after
Goldstein and will analyze what potential regulatory options the SEC may have
at its disposal to rein in the wholly unregulated hedge fund industry, especially
in light of Amaranth. Section II of this Article will serve as a brief introductory
overview of the hedge fund industry; a hedge fund will be defined, its strategies
and financial benefits described, and its previous SEC treatment under the fed-
eral securities laws detailed. Section M will briefly discuss the lead up to, and
the passage of, the SEC's "hedge fund rule," and it will establish and consider
the almost instantaneous criticisms that were raised against it. Section IV will
analyze the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit's decision in Goldstein v. SEC, which vacated the SEC's "hedge fund rule."
Finally, Section V of this Article will address the impact that the Goldstein deci-
sion had on the hedge fund industry, and it will analyze the latest efforts to reign
in the hedge fund industry in light of Goldstein and the devastating losses suf-
fered by Amaranth Advisors and its investors.
H1. HEDGE FUND "FOUNDATIONS"
A. A "Hedge Fund" Defined
As stated at the outset of this Article, a hedge fund is most commonly
described as "any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, admin-
15 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
16 Id. at 883. See infra Part IV.
17 Chris Clair, The SEC Rule: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS,
Aug. 9, 2006.
18 Jenny Anderson, After Loss, Hedge Fund Will Close, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 30, 2006, at Cl.
See infra Part V.B.
[Vol. I110
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istered by professional investment managers, and not widely available to the
public." 19 Assuming that these pooled investments are referred to as "hedge
funds," one skilled in the art of investment would be quick to believe that a
hedge fund's primary investment strategy consists of "hedging" risks.20 How-
ever, that is no longer the case. Today, hedge fund advisers can employ dozens
of investing strategies, including or in addition to traditional hedging;21 there-
fore, defining what a hedge fund is based on its investment strategies provides
no baseline characterization. Instead, a proper and more understandable defini-
tion of a hedge fund can be achieved by considering a hedge fund's organiza-
22tional and management structure.
Hedge funds are commonly organized as private limited partnerships so
as to (1) avoid falling "victim," or so they contend, to SEC registration and
oversight by utilizing various exemptions and safe harbors under the federal
securities laws, 23 and (2) to avoid the fund itself, as a distinct legal entity, from
having to be taxed for the earnings it generates.24 Therefore, as a private limited
partnership, a hedge fund has its profits taxed only at the level of the individual
investor.25 These two benefits, among other things, allow hedge fund advisers
to maintain their mysterious investing behaviors26 and maximize profits for their
19 See supra note 1.
20 A "hedge" is "an investment that is taken out specifically to reduce or cancel out the risk in
another investment." Wikipedia.com, Definition of Hedge, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/hedging
(last visited Nov. 16, 2007) (defining "hedge"). See McClean, supra note 8, at 108 ("hedging"
means "[t]aking a position in two or more securities that are negatively correlated to reduce risk")
(quoting STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE, 262-64 (6th ed. 2002)). See Jacob Preis-
erowicz, The New Regulatory Regime for Hedge Funds: Has the SEC Gone Down the Wrong
Path?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807, 809 (2006) (defining a "hedging" strategy as the "pur-
chasing of [a] security and [then] taking an offsetting position in a related security" so as to reduce
("hedge") the overall risk of loss on the investment considered as a whole). A common example
of a hedge fund "hedging" its risk is where the fund invests in both long and short equity posi-
tions. Scott J. Lederman, Hedge Funds, in FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE FOR
LAWYERS 11-3 to -5 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2000).
21 See infra Part 11.B for a discussion of the various investing strategies employed by hedge
fund advisers.
22 Lederman, supra note 20.
23 Preiserowicz, supra note 20, at 811-12. The securities laws that hedge funds avoid by struc-
turing themselves as private limited partnerships are, namely, the U.S. Securities Act of 1933
[hereinafter the Securities Act], the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter the
Exchange Act], the Investment Company Act of 1940 [hereinafter the ICA], and the IAA. For a
detailed discussion of how hedge funds are organized so as to qualify for the IAA's "private ad-
viser exemption," see infra Part II.C.
24 SEC Staff Report to the SEC: Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, at 9, n.27 (Sept.
2003) [hereinafter SEC Staff Report].
25 Id.
26 See infra Part II.B for a discussion on the various investing behaviors utilized by hedge fund
advisers.
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high-profile investors without any considerable SEC oversight.27 Unlike mutual
funds or other investment companies that sell shares to their investors, the inves-
tors in a hedge fund serve as actual partners in the private partnership and re-
ceive a proportionate share of the hedge fund's profits while only being liable
for the losses of assets that they personally invest into the fund.28 The hedge
fund "adviser, ' 29 who also usually invests a lot of his or her own personal for-
tune into the fund, serves as the hedge fund's general partner and bears the risk
of unlimited liability for the fund and its assets or debts. 30 But, it is important to
keep in mind that in exchange for this added risk, hedge fund advisers are com-
pensated handsomely. Hedge fund advisers make an inordinate amount of
money off of the investments that they make on behalf of the hedge funds that
they advise; 31 it is not uncommon for a successful hedge fund adviser to make
27 Because hedge funds organize themselves around the many exemptions in the federal secu-
rities laws, their investors must meet certain net-worth and/or investment levels, as required under
these exemptions, so as to avoid SEC registration. To avoid regulation under the ICA:
[H]edge funds rely on one of two exclusions from the definition of investment company.
The first exclusion is available to hedge funds that have 100 or fewer investors. The
second exclusion applies to hedge funds that sell their interests only to highly sophisti-
cated investors. To rely on either exclusion, the hedge fund must restrict its offerings so
that they meet the requirements for non-public offerings.
SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at IX. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 11-13. See Gib-
son, supra note 7, at 696-99. See also McClean, supra note 8, at 116, 117 (citing SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953) (whether an offering is non-public depends on whether
or not the offerees are considered accredited, in that the offerees have to be sophisticated enough
to obtain and analyze the financial data from the offeror that would be disclosed had the offeror
been registered with the SEC)). To avoid regulation under the Securities Act:
[H]edge funds may not offer their securities publicly or engage in [any] public solicita-
tion. Instead, hedge funds generally sell their interests in private offerings ...[by]
sel[ling] their interests to an unlimited number of "accredited investors." Accredited in-
vestors include individuals with a minimum annual income of $200,000... or $1 mil-
lion in net worth and most institutions with $5 million in assets.
SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at X. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 13-18. See Gib-
son, supra note 7, at 688-91. See also Preiserowicz, supra note 20, at 814-16. Hedge funds also
avoid SEC regulation under the Exchange Act, see SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 18-20. See
also Gibson, supra note 7, at 691-93.
28 Preiserowicz, supra note 20, at 812.
29 The IAA defines an "investment adviser" as "any person who, for compensation, engages in
the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concern-
ing securities ...." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (2006).
30 Id.
31 A hedge fund adviser gets paid essentially two times for his or her "investment advice."
First, the adviser makes an "investment management fee," usually one to two percent of the hedge
fund's net assets. SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 61. And, unlike advisers of other invest-
ment vehicles, the hedge fund adviser, as the general partner of the hedge fund, makes an "incen-
tive allocation" of partnership earnings and profits (known in the industry as the adviser's "per-
formance fees") that total typically around 20% of the hedge funds yearly net income. Id. There-
[Vol. 110
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tens of millions of dollars in one year as compensation for his investment exper-
tise.
B. Typical Hedge Fund Investing Strategies and Benefits
3 2
Hedge fund advisers are in the business of making money for their in-
vestors. In fact, the benchmark for any hedge fund adviser's investing strategy
is to achieve an "absolute return" 33 for their investors by generating profits for
the hedge fund regardless of what way the markets are moving.34 To ensure that
they can provide this positive absolute return, hedge fund advisers engage in a
wide variety of investment strategies.35 And, because hedge funds are wholly
unregulated by the SEC, hedge fund advisers are "essentially free to employ any
(legal) [investment] strategy that they please, ' 36 no matter what the risk, in order
to meet the higher, above market, levels of return expected from their savvy
investors.37 To generate these returns, hedge fund advisers will typically engage
in three types of investing strategies: relative value, event driven, and opportun-
istic investing.38 First, under a relative value strategy, a hedge fund adviser will
attempt to generate returns "by extracting profits from the price inefficiencies in
specific financial instruments. .. [which] occur when the price of the financial
fore, just like any other investment adviser, a hedge fund adviser does not get paid unless his or
her investors get paid. However, the difference is that hedge fund advisers have much more of a
fiscal incentive to make money for the hedge funds they advise; therefore, there is the increased
risk that a hedge fund adviser's personal monetary objectives may come into conflict with those of
the investors in the hedge fund they advise. For limitations on a hedge fund adviser's "incentive
allocation," see id. at 62-63.
32 By no means is this an exhaustive overview of the investment strategies of hedge fund ad-
visers or the benefits derived from such strategies. The purpose of this Subsection is only to es-
tablish a background for which the reader of this Note may be better able to understand the need,
if any, for SEC regulation over the hedge fund industry based on a hedge fund's typical invest-
ment strategies. For such a discussion, see infra Parts III-V.
33 Jonathan Bevilacqua, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines Between Hedge
Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BuFF. L. REv. 251, 259 (2006). A hedge fund adviser's
investing strategy is one that:
[emphasizes] . . .absolute returns as opposed to relative returns. While registered in-
vestment vehicles such as mutual funds measure their success by relative returns and
performance in relation to a benchmark such as the [Dow Jones or the] S&P 500 (even
if this may be accomplished with a negative return), hedge funds are striving to meet a
certain level of expected return for the investor, regardless of the market's current per-
formance.
Preiserowicz, supra note 20, at 809.
34 Erik J. Greupner, Hedge Funds Are Headed Down-Market: A Call for Increased Regula-
tion?, 40 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 1555, 1560 (2003).
35 SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 4.
36 Preiserowicz, supra note 20, at 813.
37 Id. at 808-10.
38 McClean, supra note 8, at 110. See Gibson, supra note 7, at 685-88.
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instruments differs from its historical value., 39 To accomplish this, the adviser
will, assuming securities are historically undervalued, take a long position in an
undervalued security and a short position in an overvalued security with the
hope that one position will surpass the other.4 ° Second, under an event driven
strategy, a hedge fund adviser will attempt to generate a return to his or her in-
vestors by taking "financial positions based on whether a [certain] company will
or will not go through a structural change," such as a merger or acquisition,
which could ultimately affect the restructured company's stock price.4' To do
this, the adviser will take a long position in such a company hoping that the
value of its debt or equity securities will increase due to the company's likely
restructuring.42 Finally, under an opportunistic investing strategy, a hedge fund
adviser will attempt to make his investors a profit by manipulating the markets
through the use of short selling funds, emerging market funds, long/short funds,
etc.43 This strategy is contentious-advisers are making the market a "puppet"
and getting it to do what they want in order to maximize profits for their inves-
tors. To the adviser's investor such a strategy is brilliant; to the market such a
strategy is manipulative and self-centered in that advisers are attempting to play
both sides of the market at the same time.
In all three of these general investment strategies, hedge funds make use
of, to varying degrees, their secret weapon-leverage. 44 Leverage is, basically,
the hedge fund's debt-to-asset ratio maintained by the fund's adviser. 45 It en-
ables the adviser to borrow money without collateral, so to speak, in order to
increase the fund's market exposure and potentially increase the fund's profits;
however, the use of leverage magnifies a hedge fund's potential risk of loss.4
6
Unlike other SEC registered investment vehicles, unregistered and unregulated
hedge funds' use of leverage is not restricted.4 7 Therefore, a hedge fund adviser
willing to take a big risk by taking on more leverage can obtain huge profits for
the fund and its investors; but, one bad and highly leveraged investment could
39 McClean, supra note 8, at 110.
40 Gibson, supra note 7, at 685 n.29.
41 McClean, supra note 8, at 110.
42 Gibson, supra note 7, at 686 n.30.
43 McClean, supra note 8, at 110-11.
Many hedge funds employ strategies that involve betting on one asset against another
asset. One might bet on ice-cream stocks rising, winter-parka stocks falling and then
pray for warm weather. Another might bet against government debt with low interest
rates, invest in company bonds with high interest rates and hope corporate finances stay
healthy.
Justin Lahart, Hedge Funds Start to Look Like Risky Bets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at Cl.
44 Rory B. O'Halloran, An Overview and Analysis of Recent Interest in Increased Hedge Fund
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spell catastrophe for the hedge fund and, if the hedge fund was extremely lever-
aged, the financial markets as a whole.48
As mentioned above, the goal of a hedge fund adviser is to achieve an
absolute positive return for his or her wealthy investors. Advisers are able to
achieve this goal generally through investment strategies focused towards mar-
ket neutrality, namely by ensuring investor returns regardless of how the stock
market is performing.49 To this end, hedge funds benefit U.S. financial markets
in many ways.50  "[Hedge funds] contribute substantially to . . . market effi-
ciency ... and liquidity. ' '51 Namely, hedge funds provide liquidity in that they
invest "substantial sums [of assets] in otherwise illiquid markets and ... take
positions, formulate strategies, and make trades based on sophisticated and ex-
tensive market research. [H]edge funds provide markets with price informa-
tion. 52 They "act as risk absorbers . . . by serving as ready counterparties to
those wishing to hedge their risk, even when the markets are volatile. In addition
their active trading and research contribute to greater pricing efficiencies. 53
Furthermore, "hedge funds also can serve as an important risk management tool
for investors by providing valuable portfolio diversification. Hedge fund in-
vestment strategies are typically designed to protect investment [capital] . . .
[and] to preserve wealth;" 54 therefore, their "hedging" investment strategies
often appeal to investors with other investments carrying more inherent risk.
48 The $3.5 billion dollar loss to the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998
resulted from it being leveraged at a debt-to-asset ratio upwards of 50 to 1. O'Halloran, supra
note 44, at n. 18. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the Long-Term Capital Management's
leveraged implosion, and its effect on the financial markets, see Justin Asbury Dillmore, Com-
ment, Leap Before You Look: The SEC's Approach to Hedge Fund Regulation, 32 OHo N.U.L.
REv. 169, 170-74 (2006). It must be noted that a hedge fund may suffer huge losses even though
the fund itself refrained from highly leveraged positions. For a further discussion on the dynamics
surrounding the implosion of a hedge fund due to a "bad" bet, see infra Part V, in which the recent
liquidation of the hedge fund Amaranth Advisors will be discussed in detail.
49 McClean, supra note 8, at 111. But, it is worth noting that, at least as of late, hedge fund
returns have been volatile and, once the investment adviser is compensated with 20% of the hedge
fund's profits, typical investor returns have recently lagged behind those produced within the
broader stock market. Gregory Zuckerman et al., Fortress's IPO Bonanza May Draw Private-
Equity Firms to Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10-11, 2006, at Al (hedge funds returned, on average,
12.9% to investors in 2006, behind overall returns to investors in the broader stock market).
50 Cox Testimony, supra note 6.
51 Id.
52 O'Halloran, supra note 44, at 465.
53 McClean, supra note 8, at 114.
Many hedge fund advisers take speculative trading positions on behalf of their managed
hedge funds based on extensive research about the true value or future value of a secu-
rity .... Because securities markets are dynamic, the result of such trading is that mar-
ket prices ... will move toward their true value .... [This] bring[s] [correct] price in-
formation to the securities markets, which can translate into market price efficiencies.
SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 4.
54 SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at 5.
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C. How Hedge Funds Avoid Regulation under the IAA
As stated above, the adviser (general partner) of a hedge fund will or-
ganize the fund as a limited liability partnership in order to avoid SEC registra-
tion and oversight under the various federal securities laws, namely the Securi-
ties Act, the Exchange Act, the ICA, and the IAA.55 Each of these federal secu-
rities laws, their exemptions and how hedge funds have utilized them are impor-
tant to understanding how hedge funds are ultimately structured to avoid SEC
registration and oversight; however, due to United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit's decision to vacate the SEC's "hedge fund rule" under the IAA
in Goldstein v. SEC,56 this Article will focus solely on the IAA, its private ad-
viser exemption and how hedge fund advisers employ the exemption to avoid
SEC oversight.57
Pursuant to the LAA, "it shall be unlawful for any investment adviser,
unless [already] registered [with the SEC] .... to make use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with his or [her]
business as an investment adviser., 58 Thus, the IAA requires that all "invest-
ment advisors" 59 register with the SEC and, as a result, disclose certain informa-
tion and documents that are "necessary or appropriate... [for protecting] inves-
tors."60 This LAA registration requires advisers to maintain certain business
records, deliver to clients a disclosure prospectus before they invest, and avoid
engaging in any fraudulent activity when providing investment advice to the
investors of the fund in which the adviser manages.6' IAA registration creates a
fiduciary relationship between the investment adviser and his or her clients and
requires the adviser to "disclose any material conflicts the adviser has with [his
or her] clients, to seek [the] best execution for client transactions, and to have a
reasonable basis for client recommendations. 62 Finally, an investment adviser
that registers under the SEC is "subject at any time ... to such reasonable...
55 Preiserowicz, supra note 20, at 811.
56 See infra Part IV.
57 For an explanation of how hedge funds avoid SEC regulation under the Securities Act, the
Exchange Act, and the ICA, see supra note 27.
58 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2006).
59 See supra note 29.
60 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1) (2006). See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(l)(A)-(H) (listing the information
that an adviser is initially required to disclose to the SEC when registering under the IAA). Spe-
cifically, the adviser's registration must disclose to the SEC "the nature of the business of such...
adviser, including the manner of giving advice and rendering analyses or reports," "a balance
sheet... and other financial statements," and "the nature and scope of the authority of such...
adviser with respect to clients' funds and accounts." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1)(C)-(E).
61 SEC Final Rule, supra note 14, at 338. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006) (codifying the trans-
actions in which an investment adviser is prohibited from engaging in when advising their cli-
ents). For a detailed explanation of the anti-fraud provisions in § 80b-6 of the IAA, see infra Part
V.C.3.
62 SEC Final Rule, supra note 14, at 338.
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examinations ... as the [SEC] ... deem[s] necessary or appropriate ....,,63 It is
this SEC regulatory oversight which, in theory, guarantees investors access to
material information regarding their investment advisers and protects them from
their adviser's fraudulent investments or use of their money in any manner
which is against their pecuniary interests. Therefore, the question remains: is a
hedge fund's general partner an "investment adviser" subject to SEC registra-
tion?
In 1977, that question was answered with an emphatic "yes." In Abra-
hamson v. Flescher,64 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the general partner of a hedge fund was an "investment adviser" under
the IAA and was, therefore, subject to SEC registration and oversight.65 But, if
that is the "law," then why are the majority of hedge fund advisers not registered
with the SEC? Alas, the IAA has a de minimis "private adviser exemption" that
allows hedge fund advisers to escape SEC registration.
66
Under the private adviser exemption of the IAA, an investment adviser,
including one who advises a hedge fund, does not have to register with the SEC
if "[the adviser,] during the course of the preceding twelve months[,] has had
fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds [themselves] out generally to
the public as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to any in-
vestment company registered under [the IAA]. 67 Why such an exemption from
registration? First, the IAA was enacted by Congress according to the SEC's
recommendation that:
[I]nvestment advisers [were] of national concern, in that ...
their advice, counsel, publications, writings, analyses, and re-
ports customarily relate to the purchase and sale of securities
traded on national securities exchanges, . . . issued by compa-
nies engaged in business in interstate commerce, . . . [which]
occur in such volume as substantially to affect interstate com-
merce, national securities exchanges, and other securities mar-
kets.... and the national economy.68
63 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2006).
64 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977).
65 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 869-
71); SEC v. Berger, 244 F. Supp. 2d 180, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); SEC v. Saltzman, 127 F. Supp. 2d
660, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
66 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006) [hereinafter private adviser exemption].
67 Id. Basically, the IAA's private adviser exemption states that a hedge fund adviser does not
have to register with the SEC so long as (1) during the previous calendar year the adviser did not
manage (advise) more than fourteen hedge funds (his or her "clients"); (2) the adviser does not
publicly advertise or solicit investors from the general investing public, but rather privately seeks
out such investors, and (3) the adviser does not manage (advise) any other type of investment
vehicle that was registered with the SEC under the IAA.
68 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1(1)-(3) (2006).
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Therefore, the SEC believed that investment advisers were generally engaged in
a type of financial activity that greatly impacted the U.S. economy and, there-
fore, required SEC regulatory oversight. However, the SEC conditioned this
general proposition with the private adviser exemption-investment advisers
who did not engage in investment activities of such significance to affect the
national securities markets should not be required to register under the IAA. 9
Second, the purpose of this private adviser exemption was to "afford small
groups of private investors the freedom to conduct their investment decisions in
the manner they believe[d] to be most fruitful [because] ordinarily such [small
groups of] investors are wealthy and financially sophisticated persons who do
not need the protection that [SEC] registration is intended to provide., 70 But, it
is important to note that the main principle behind the private adviser exemption
was not to allow ultra-rich investors to escape SEC regulation, but rather to al-
low advisers whose activities did not have a substantial effect on the national
security market to avoid being under the oversight of the SEC, regardless of
how wealthy their investing clients were. By doing such, the SEC would allow
those "small-time" advisers (who did not significantly impact the U.S. financial
markets) to side-step SEC regulation without impeding on the SEC's overall
responsibility of protecting investors and maintaining a fair, orderly, and effi-
cient securities market.7 '
Therefore, as per the private adviser exemption, hedge fund advisers
will not have to register under the IAA if (1) they do not hold themselves out
generally to the public as an investment adviser, and (2) they had less than fif-
teen clients during the last twelve months. 72 But, who are the advisers' "cli-
ents?" Remarkably, nowhere in the LAA is the term "client" defined. There-
fore, through regulatory promulgation, the SEC has defined a "client" of a
hedge fund adviser to include a natural person or a corporation, general partner-
ship, limited partnership, limited liability company, trust, or other legal organi-
zation.73 Thus, a hedge fund adviser may count each hedge fund he or she ad-
vises as an individual client instead of each individual investor of a hedge fund
69 SEC Final Rule, supra note 14, at 339.
70 Robert C. Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, SEC Registration of Private Investment Partner-
ships After Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1471, 1477 (1978).
71 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, available at
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Nov. 9, 2006).
72 Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 70. Determining whether the adviser held themselves out to
the investing public requires an assessment as to whether the security offering was "public" or
"non-public," and deciding that an offering is "non-public," and therefore not requiring SEC reg-
istration, "should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need the protections of
the [securities laws]." Id. at n.35 (quoting SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953)).
For statistics on the number of hedge fund advisers registered with the SEC under the IAA, see
infra note 77.
73 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a) (2006).
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under the adviser's management. 74 This "no look-through provision" allows a
hedge fund adviser to directly give investment advice to up to fourteen separate
hedge funds, and indirectly make investment decisions that will affect the in-
vestments of hundreds or thousands of actual individuals, and still qualify for
the private adviser exemption under the IAA. So long as the adviser provides
the investment advice based on the investment objectives of the hedge fund, and
not the individual investors themselves who are investing in those hedge funds,
this "no look-through" provision applies.76 The typical result of this method of
counting clients is that even the largest hedge fund advisers are exempt from
LAA registration and, consequently, SEC oversight.
77
Nevertheless, even if an adviser is exempted from registering his or her
hedge fund with the SEC because they qualify for the private adviser exemption,
the adviser is still subject to the LAA's anti-fraud provisions.78 These provisions
prohibit any investment adviser 79 from (1) "[employing] any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud any client or perspective client,"80 (2) "[engaging] in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any client or prospective client, ' 81 or (3) "[engaging] in any act, practice,,,82
or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. These
anti-fraud requirements may provide the hedge fund protection against its ad-
74 Daniel K. Liffmann, Note, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the Investment Ad-
viser Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2148, 2167 (2005).
75 Id. at n.133. In essence, the adviser may count each hedge fund as his or her client and,
therefore, even the largest hedge fund advisers will be exempt from registering under the IAA so
long as they do not advise more than fourteen individual hedge funds, even if those hedge funds
have hundreds of investors investing in them. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (2006).
76 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a)(2)(i) (2006).
77 Nonetheless, some otherwise exempted advisers have chosen to register under the IAA.
Such an atypical result will occur when the hedge fund adviser has advised more than fourteen
hedge funds in the past year or when the individual investors of those hedge funds under the con-
trol of the adviser demand that the adviser be registered before they will commit to investing in
the funds under the adviser's control. This demand, however, is far from being the status quo in a
typical hedge fund adviser-investor relationship. As of September 2003, 48% of the hedge fund
advisers listed in The Hedge Fund 100 were registered with the SEC under the IAA. SEC Staff
Report, supra note 24, at n.74. In 2004, approximately 25% of all hedge fund advisers that quali-
fied for the private adviser exemption nevertheless decided to register under the IAA. O'Halloran,
supra note 44, at 470.
78 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006).
79 Id. (emphasis added). The IAA's anti-fraud provisions apply to any and all investment
advisers, even those who advise hedge funds, regardless of whether or not they qualify for the
private adviser exemption.
80 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) (2006).
81 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (2006).
82 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (2006). Furthermore, for the purposes of § 80b-6(4), the "[SEC] shall,
... by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such
acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." Id. See
infra Parts V.C.2 - 3.
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viser employing fraudulent or deceitful investment practices.83 They do not,
however, ensure that individual investors will have access to important financial
disclosures before deciding whether or not to invest in the hedge fund, 84 nor do
they provide a meaningful shelter for the hedge fund's individual investors
against similar fraud.85
Many commentators believe that it is reasonable to allow hedge fund
advisers to escape LAA registration and SEC regulation under the private adviser
exemption because the securities laws were not enacted to protect affluent,
business-minded investors who typically have close personal relationships with
the advisers investing their money and who have access to the information re-
quired for them to make well-informed investment decisions.86 Nonetheless, at
the turn of the 21st Century the SEC began to reconsider its promulgated posi-
tion that hedge fund advisers should be exempt from registration via the private
adviser exemption, in part because of (1) the 1998 hedge fund implosion of
Long-Term Capital Investment,87 (2) the public blame put on the SEC after the88
Enron and Worldcom corporate debacles, (3) the rapid increase in the number
of hedge funds and the amount of invested assets under the control of hedge
fund advisers, 89 and (4) the fear that the lack of oversight over hedge funds
could pose a potential risk to individual hedge fund investors and to the U.S.
financial markets. As a result, the then-Chairman of the SEC, William
Donaldson, asked his staff to prepare for the SEC Commissioners a report rec-
ommending what, if any, increases in regulation should be taken to reign in
hedge funds under the umbrella of the SEC's purview. His staff came back with
such a report, and, less than two years later, the SEC promulgated a regulation
under the IAA, known as the "hedge fund rule," which changed how the number
of clients of a hedge fund adviser were counted and (more importantly) required
the majority of hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC under the IAA. 9°
83 See Cox Testimony, supra note 6 ("[H]edge funds today remain subject to SEC regulations
and enforcement under the antifraud ... provisions of the federal securities laws .... Hedge
funds are not, should not be, and will not be [totally] unregulated").
84 See infra Parts .A - B.
85 See infra Parts V.C.2 - 3.
86 Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 70.
87 See Dillmore, supra note 48.
88 See andre douglas pond cummings, The Integration Conundrum: Debilitating Failures of
the Securities and Exchange Commission Must Be Addressed as U.S. Corporate Malfeasance is
'Getting Serious, So Serious,'48 WAYNE L. REv. 1305, 1306-19 (2003).
89 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
90 See infra Part I1I.B.
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III. THE SEC'S 2004 "HEDGE FUND RULE"-FROM STAFF REPORT TO
PROMULGATION
A. "The Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds"-The SEC's 2003
Staff Report
In 2002, Chairman Donaldson requested that the SEC's staff investigate
the growth of hedge funds in the United States. Specifically, the staff investi-
gated (1) the recent amazing increase in the number of hedge funds;9' (2) the
increased interest of institutional investors, the coined "retailization" of hedge
funds; (3) the SEC's lack of information about hedge funds and their advisers
due to the IAA's private adviser exemption, and (4) if this lack of information
prevented the SEC from ensuring that material information was made available
to hedge fund investors to assist them in making the fully informed investment
decision of whether or not to invest in a particular hedge fund.92  After a two
year investigation, the SEC's staff primarily recommended that the SEC should
"[amend] Rule 203(b)(3)-1 under the [IAA] to require hedge fund advisers to
'look through' any hedge funds that they manage and count each separate inves-
tor as a client [for purposes of determining if a hedge fund adviser is eligible for
the private adviser exemption]. 9 3  The SEC staff believed an amendment to
91 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
92 SEC Staff Report, supra note 24, at VII-X. The SEC Staff Report details major concerns
with the growth of the hedge fund industry. Id. at 76-83. First, the SEC's staff was concerned
that it lacked sufficient regulatory oversight over hedge funds and their advisers. Id. Second, the
SEC's staff was concerned that this lack of oversight prevents the SEC from having any meaning-
ful information about how many hedge funds exist in the U.S., how much assets hedge fund ad-
visers control, what investment practices hedge fund advisers were utilizing throughout the securi-
ties markets, and what affect, if any, such practices could have on the U.S. financial markets. Id.
Third, the SEC's staff was anxious about the possible increase of hedge fund "retailization" (insti-
tutional investment in hedge funds from non-typical hedge fund investors, such as pension funds,
endowments, universities, and other public investment funds, i.e. mutual funds, investing in hedge
funds ("funds of hedge funds")), and the likely increase of less sophisticated investors purchasing
interests in hedge funds as a result of such "retailization." Id. Fourth, the SEC's staff was con-
cerned that there was a lack of sufficient disclosure in that investors may not always receive mate-
rial information regarding the adviser and their management of the hedge fund. Id. Finally, the
SEC's staff feared that hedge fund advisers were investing their investor's assets in ways contrary
to the financial interests of their investors and for their own pecuniary benefit. Id.
93 Id. at 89. In all, the SEC Staff Report put forth nine recommendations for the SEC to con-
sider regarding hedge funds, the regulation of hedge funds, and the possible effects that hedge
funds could have on U.S. financial markets. See id. at 89-103. For purposes of this Note, the
Staff Report's major recommendation of requiring hedge fund advisers to register under the IAA
is probative; but, it is worth noting that three of the Staff Report's recommendations specifically
were tailored for the benefit of the individual investor. First, the Staff Report recommended that
the SEC should require all hedge fund advisers to provide financial disclosure prospectuses to
investors before they invest in the hedge fund. Id. at 97-99. Second, the Staff Report recom-
mended that individual investors that invest in "funds of hedge funds" should be informed by the
investment vehicle that they are investing in what the hedge fund adviser will collect as their
"performance fee" for the assets the initial fund invests in the hedge fund. Id. at 99-100. Finally,
15
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Rule 203(b)(3)-1 would be within the spirit of the IAA, and the overall federal
securities laws, because "the underlying purpose of [the private adviser exemp-
tion] ... was ... to exempt advisers whose advisory business [was] so limited
that it [did] not warrant federal attention." 94 Furthermore, the SEC staff saw this
proposal as the "least intrusive form of regulation available to address many of
the concerns identified [due to the growth of the hedge fund industry because
it]:
... would not result in any changes with respect to those advis-
ers' ability to effectuate their investment strategies[,] . . . [it]
would not place any restrictions on hedge fund advisers' ability
to trade securities, use leverage, sell securities short or enter
into derivatives transaction[,] ... [it] would not result in hedge
funds having to register [their] [securities] offerings.., with the
Commission, nor would it require that they modify their organ-
izational structures[,] ... [and it] would [generally] not restrict
the amount of fees that hedge fund advisers may charge hedge
funds ....
The SEC's staff did not make such a recommendation without having
what they believed to be credible justifications for why a hedge fund adviser's
"clients" should be re-defined under the IAA, so as to require the majority of
hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC and fall under its watchful eye.
First, registration would serve as a potential deterrent to fraud and would in-
crease the likelihood that the SEC could spot hedge fund advisers committing
fraud before the hedge fund suffered substantial losses.96  Second, by re-
the Staff Report recommended that the SEC should focus on ensuring that hedge fund investors
are well educated and understand the risky nature of their investment before investing in hedge
funds by requiring hedge fund advisers to make improvements in the amount of information that
they willingly make available to potential investors. Id. at 103.
94 Id. at 89. This is one of the SEC's pillar arguments when it comes to closing off hedge
funds' access to the private adviser exception. The SEC's logic is essentially that (1) the private
adviser exemption was intended to apply to private investment vehicles that attract a few wealthy,
knowledgeable investors who have close ties with their adviser; (2) because of the way "clients"
are determined under the IAA, hedge fund advisers are allowed to advise up to fourteen separate
hedge funds; (3) each one of these hedge funds can have hundreds of separate individual inves-
tors; therefore, hedge fund advisers are controlling the investments of literally thousands of indi-
vidual investments without being registered under the IAA; and (4) this lack of regulation could
have negative consequences on the individual hedge fund investors and the financial markets of
the U.S.; therefore, how a "client" is defined violates the underlying purpose of the private adviser
exemption and, thus, should be amended. However, the question becomes: does the Staff Re-
port's proposed "look-through" provision violate the plain meaning of the word "client" as estab-
lished in the IAA? See infra Part IV (in which the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit in Goldstein v. SEC held that it did).
95 Id. at 92.
96 Id. at 92-93. From 1999 to 2003, the SEC brought 38 enforcement actions against hedge
fund advisers for fraudulent practices. Id. at 73. However, it is noteworthy that the SEC Staff
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defining a hedge fund adviser's "clients" to include the individual investors of
the adviser's hedge funds, the advisers would now owe a fiduciary duty to these
individual investors to avoid conflicts of interest. Advisers would, therefore,
have to implement certain compliance guidelines to avoid making investment
decisions solely for the adviser's own personal fiscal gain.97 Finally, requiring
hedge fund advisers to register under the IAA would
permit the [SEC] to collect basic information about virtually all
hedge fund advisers, including the number of hedge funds that
they manage, the amount of assets of those hedge funds and the
identity of persons controlling the hedge fund advisers[,] ...
[which] would enable the [SEC] to more comprehensively and
effectively observe the trading [practices] of ... [hedge fund]
advisers.
98
Although the SEC Staff Report was firm in its conviction that greater
hedge fund regulation was essential to protecting investors and the securities
markets as a whole, the Report did not avoid addressing the concerns it had with
requiring hedge fund advisers to register under the IAA, namely the costs that
both hedge fund advisers and the SEC would incur due to mandatory registra-
tion.99 For the advisers themselves, registration would require them to pay ini-
tial and yearly filing fees, implement recordkeeping procedures so as to ensure
accumulation of information required to be reported under the IAA, and face the
ongoing costs associated with regulatory compliance.'00 As for the SEC, it
would have to figure out a way to stretch its resources to ensure that it remained
vigilant and comprehensive in its examination of the thousands of adviser regis-
trations that would be filed as a result of the amended "look-through" provisions
under the private adviser exemption.'0 '
B. The SEC's Final "Hedge Fund Rule " Requiring the Majority of Hedge
Fund Advisers to Register Under the IAA
We believe that, in light of the growth of hedge funds, the
broadening exposure of investors to hedge fund risk, and the
growing number of instances of malfeasance by hedge fund ad-
Report found that hedge fund advisers were not engaging in a disproportionate amount of fraudu-
lent activity as compared to other investment advisers. Id. This concession is used by many of
the opponents of the SEC's "hedge fund rule" to argue that increased hedge fund regulation is not
necessary. See infra Part III.C.
97 Id. at 93.
98 Id. at 94.
99 Id. at 96-97.
100 Id. at 96.
101 Id. at 97.
17
Hess: How Arbitrary Really Was the S.E.C.'s "Hedge Fund Rule"? The Futu
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
visers, our current regulatory program for hedge fund advisers
is inadequate. We do not have an effective program that would
provide us with the ability to deter or detect fraud by unregis-
tered hedge fund advisers. We currently rely almost entirely on
enforcement actions brought after the fraud has occurred and
investor assets are gone. We lack basic information about
hedge fund advisers and the hedge fund industry ... Requiring
hedge fund advisers to register under the [IAA] will give us the
ability to oversee hedge fund advisers without imposing bur-
dens on the legitimate investment activities of hedge funds ...
No commenter identified any provision of the [LAA] that would
provide an impediment to an adviser's successful operation of a
hedge fund [upon now having to register with the SEC under
the IAA].' 0 2
Armed with the findings and primary recommendation of the SEC Staff
Report, a divided SEC Board of Commissioners passed the "hedge fund rule" to
amend Section 203(b)(3) of the IAA in November of 2005 by a vote of three to
two. 10 3 This new rule drastically changed how a hedge fund adviser's "clients"
would be determined under the IAA and its private adviser exemption. In es-
sence, the rule provided for a "look-through" provision in which the adviser of a
hedge fund could no longer count the hedge fund itself as his or her client, but
rather each individual private investor of the adviser's hedge fund would be
counted as a client for purposes of determining whether the adviser was exempt
from SEC registration via the private adviser exemption of the IAA." 4 Thus,
"an adviser to a private [hedge] fund ... [could] no longer rely on the private
adviser exemption if the adviser, during the course of the preceding twelve
months, [had] advised [a hedge fund] that had more than fourteen [individual]
investors."' 10 5 The effect of the "hedge fund rule" would be extraordinary: the
102 SEC Final Rule, supra note 14, at 342-43.
103 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The dissenting SEC Commissioners believed the
majority's "hedge fund rule" greatly overstepped the SEC's regulatory authority under the IAA.
See infra Part HI.C. 1 for the dissenting Commissioners' reasoning and alternate recommendations.
104 SEC Final Rule, supra note 14, at 354. The effective date of the "hedge fund rule" was
February 10, 2005, and non-exempt hedge fund advisers had until February 1, 2006, to apply for
registration with the SEC. Id. at 360.
15 Id. at 354 (hedge fund advisers remained exempt from IAA registration only if they advised
no more than fourteen individual investors, not fourteen individual hedge funds). There is one
small caveat to the hedge fund rule that remains in effect under the private adviser exemption: a
hedge fund adviser with more than fourteen individual investors only has to register under the
IAA if the adviser has a minimum of $25 million under his or her management. Id. Regardless
of how many clients they have, advisers do not fall under the purview of the SEC via the IAA
unless they manage at least $25 million in assets. This makes sense when considering the private
adviser exemption because private investment advisers with only minimal clients and assets under
their control are not a risk to the U.S. securities markets and, thus, are deemed not to be of such a
significant concern that SEC oversight is needed to protect the general investing public.
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majority of hedge fund advisers would no longer be exempt under the private
adviser exemption and, therefore, they would have to register under the IAA,
become compliant with SEC regulations, and fall "victim" (as many opponents
of the "hedge fund rule" viewed it) to SEC investigations and oversight. 1°6 In
essence, these "sexy" investment pools and their business savvy advisers would
no longer receive preferential SEC treatment, even if they served as the invest-
ment playgrounds for institutional investors and the very rich.
Believing that the "hedge fund rule" reflected the proper administration
of the IAA and its private adviser exemption,10 7 the SEC relied on a multitude of
justifications for implementing the new Section 203(b)(3) amendment. 10 8 First,
requiring advisers to register with the SEC would provide it with "the ability to
collect important information that [it lacked] about [a] growing segment of the
U.S. financial system."' 9 This information was important to the SEC because
there was a genuine lack of "reliable data on even the number of hedge funds [in
the U.S.] or the amount of their assets."" 0 Second, because the rule would re-
quire advisers to register under the IAA, the SEC would be in a better position
to detect, prevent, and deter fraud than it would have been had hedge funds re-
mained unregistered."' Third, requiring hedge fund advisers to register under
106 Registration under the IAA will require:
hedge funds to disclose information such as their trading strategy, the amount of money
they manage, and the manager's disciplinary history. Also required ... is a description
of who its clients are, the educational and business background of those running the
fund, and audited financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. Finally, hedge funds subject to the new rule will have to adopt a
code of ethics and implement a compliance program.
McClean, supra note 8, at 120 (internal quotations omitted). The "hedge fund rule" has its bene-
fits. The rule's increased disclosure requirements will (1) allow the SEC to determine the sys-
temic risk that hedge funds pose on financial markets, (2) ensure the free flow of accurate infor-
mation to investors and regulators, which will make the markets more efficient, while at the same
time discouraging fraud and inaccurate reporting of information, and (3) will result in better in-
formed investors who are able to make more informed, rational investment decisions. Id. at 137-
39.
107 SEC Final Rule, supra note 14, at 344.
108 The SEC viewed its promulgation of the new "hedge fund rule" as being within its legal
authority under § 211 (a) of the IAA because the term "client" was not defined by Congress in the
IAA, nor did the word "client" have one clear definition; therefore, the SEC believed it had the
power to alter how a "client" was defined when doing so would seemingly keep in the spirit of the
IAA and the private adviser exemption of only exempting those advisers whose activities were not
significantly large enough to impact the national securities markets. Id. at 351-53.
109 Id. at 344.
110 Id.
III Id. at 345 (explaining that a key part of the SEC's purpose to protect hedge fund investors
from fraud will be aided through registration because the SEC will be able to "identify compliance
problems at an early stage, identify practices that may be harmful to investors, and provide a
deterrent to unlawful conduct") (internal citations omitted). The SEC addressed the fact that
hedge fund fraud was not disproportionately higher than instances of fraud in other investment
vehicles; however, it did not find this fact to be fatal to the new rule because it believed that there
19
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the LAA would force them, in order to comply with SEC regulations pursuant to
the IAA, "to adopt policies and procedures ... to ensure compliance with the
securities laws, and to foster more effective compliance practices."' 12 Fourth, to
limit the amount of "retailization" occurring as pension funds, endowments,
universities and funds of funds increasingly invest their investor's money in
hedge funds, SEC registration and oversight under the IAA would ensure that
hedge funds continue to maintain high minimum "buy-in" standards to ensure
that potentially unsophisticated investors remained protected. 13  Finally, the
SEC reasoned that the passage of the new "hedge fund rule" would ensure the
proper administration of the IAA and its private adviser exemption because it
would prevent hedge fund advisers from "[managing] large amounts of securi-
ties indirectly through hedge funds that may have, collectively, hundreds of in-
vestors" without first being registered with the SEC. 1 4 The SEC believed that
re-defining a hedge fund adviser's "client" as the individual investor of the
hedge fund, instead of the actual hedge fund itself, was appropriate because:
advisers to hedge funds market their services based on the
skills, ability, and expertise of the persons who will make the
fund's investment decisions. Thus, the clients [the individual
investors of a hedge fund] will still rely exclusively on the ef-
forts and skill of the investment adviser, and any new investors
will be attracted to the hedge fund as a means to obtain the asset
management services of the adviser. The clients will periodi-
was a notable increase in hedge fund fraud since the SEC Staff Report was issued, which had
adversely affected the pecuniary interests of many hedge fund investors. Id. See supra note 96
and accompanying text. For specific examples of SEC actions brought against hedge fund advis-
ers since the SEC's Staff Report, see Cox Testimony, supra note 6. Furthermore, the "hedge fund
rule" would allow the SEC to screen hedge fund advisers before issuing registration and deny
registration to any hedge fund adviser determined to be an "unscrupulous person [attempting to
use] the hedge fund as a vehicle to defraud investors." Id. at 346.
112 Id. at 346-47. The SEC admitted that the hedge funds would incur costs as a result of com-
plying with this new regulation; however, it noted that such costs were not uncommon amongst
other registered investment vehicles, many of which with much smaller investing constituents and
much fewer resources available for implementing such compliance. Id. at 347. Furthermore, the
SEC reminded hedge fund advisers that such de minimis compliance costs could simply be de-
ducted from the adviser's generous management and performance fees and, therefore, the hedge
fund would not bear any additional cost for complying with the new regulation. Id. at 347.
113 Id. at 347-48.
114 Id. at 348-49. In essence, the SEC's logic was that the private adviser exemption was en-
acted by Congress only to allow advisers to be exempt from registration under the IAA when their
"business activities [were] too limited to warrant federal attention [because] .. .[their] activities
were not national in scope[,] and ... provided advice to only a small number of clients," regard-
less of how rich or sophisticated its clients may have been. Id. Therefore, the SEC reasoned, the
way in which a hedge fund adviser's "clients" were calculated needed to be amended because
hedge fund advisers were impersonally investing the assets of hundreds and even thousands of
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cally receive reports from the adviser about the hedge fund, and
their decisions whether or not to withdraw their assets from the
fund will necessarily rely heavily on those reports [and the re-
turns realized from their investments due to the adviser's in-
vestment decisions]." 15
However, to many critics, these justifications for re-defining a hedge
fund adviser's "client" and, thus, requiring most hedge fund advisers to register
with the SEC under the IAA, were not sufficient. And, these criticisms would
be quickly voiced.
C. The Critics of the SEC's "Hedge Fund Rule"
1. The Dissenting SEC Commissioners
As mentioned above, the SEC narrowly passed the "hedge fund rule."
The two dissenting Commissioners, Cynthia Glassman and Paul Atkins, argued
that the promulgated "hedge fund rule" would not address or correct the prob-
lems and issues cited by the majority as justifications for why mandatory IAA
registration was necessary.' 16 The dissenters did not debate the "ends" of what
the SEC was trying to accomplish. They agreed that hedge funds were a rapidly
growing industry in the U.S. financial markets and that more qualified informa-
tion was necessary for the SEC to understand what affect hedge funds would
have on both the marketplace and investors; but, they disagreed that the promul-
gated "hedge fund rule," the "means," would adequately resolve those con-
cerns." 7 Namely, the dissenters argued (1) that there were better alternatives
that could have been effectuated to more adequately address the majority's con-
cern with hedge funds being wholly unregulated; 18 (2) that the ultimate reasons
put forth by the majority as justification for the new "hedge fund rule" were not
adequately supported, in that the cited trends of both increased hedge fund
fraud 19 and hedge fund "retailization" were not occurring at the detrimental rate
15 Id. at 353-54.
116 Id. at 430-41.
117 Id. at 431.
118 The dissenting Commissioners believed that the SEC should have pursued alternative means
for obtaining the necessary information regarding hedge funds, such as through the "pooling of
information from [SEC] registrants and other government agencies and self-regulatory organiza-
tions that collect data on hedge funds, enhanced oversight of existing [hedge fund] registrants, a
census of all hedge funds, and requiring additional periodic and systematic information to be filed
with [the SEC by hedge fund advisers]." Id. at 431-32.
119 The dissenting Commissioners argued that the instances of fraud cited by the majority as
one of its bases for implementing the "hedge fund rule" did not realistically provide an adequate
justification for implementing the regulation because "in most [instances], the hedge fund advisers
21
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suggested by the majority;1 20 (3) that it would be impossible for the SEC to suc-
cessfully implement its new "hedge fund rule" because the SEC simply did not
have the resources to evaluate thousands of registration applications, oversee all
of the investment activities engaged in by hedge fund advisers, or investigate
and prosecute in a timely manner any instance of fraudulent or unlawful hedge
fund activity that occurred; 121 and (4) that the SEC's re-defining of hedge fund
adviser's "clients" marked a major departure from the SEC's previous determi-
nation of whether an individual investor was the "client" of an investment ad-
viser, based on whether or not the adviser tailored their investment advice to the
investor's financial objectives.122
2. The Scholarly Debate and its Ensuing Criticisms
At the heart of the SEC's "hedge fund rule" was the need for greater
disclosure of information from hedge fund advisers. The "hedge fund rule," by
requiring the registration of a majority of hedge fund advisers, would necessitate
that this information be disclosed to both the SEC and those individuals invest-
ing in the hedge funds under the management of the newly registered adviser.
These disclosures would provide the SEC with a better understanding of the
intricacies of hedge funds in order to evaluate how they affect the U.S. financial
markets. Additionally, these disclosures would provide investors, at least in
theory, with better tools to use when making the decision of whether or not to
invest in a hedge fund. Thus, these more fully equipped investors would be
better protected from potential hedge fund abuses. 23 This premise has served as
the battlefield for the policy debate on whether or not the SEC's promulgated
"hedge fund rule," and resulting increase in regulation, was necessary for the
hedge fund industry.1 24 Namely, should the SEC be looking out for the rich,
sophisticated investor choosing to invest large amounts of money into an un-
would have been too small to be registered under the new requirement [because they had less than
$25 million in assets under their management], were already registered [when the fraud occurred],
or should have been registered [at the time of the fraud]. Id. at 434.
120 In response to the majority's justification of the new regulation on grounds that hedge fund
"retailization" was increasing, the dissenting Commissioners cited to the SEC Staff Report, which
found that hedge fund "retailization" was truly of little concern because (1) the current minimum
investment requirements precluded most unsophisticated individuals from investing in a hedge
fund, (2) pension fund investments in hedge funds accounted for "only eight percent of total hedge
fund investments," and (3) pension funds, endowments and universities are "managed by fiduciar-
ies ... [who] ... are highly-skilled... [and] responsible for determining whether to invest in
hedge funds, the types of hedge funds in which to invest, and how to weigh risk ... in making
these [investment] determinations." Id. at 435.
121 Id. at 431,435.
122 Id. at 431, 439-40.
123 For instances of hedge fund abuses, see generally supra notes 48, 111 and accompanying
text. See also infra Part V (B).
124 Greupner, supra note 34, at 1585.
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regulated hedge fund in hopes of achieving huge returns? The critics' defini-
tively answer "no."
One prevalent argument against SEC regulation of hedge funds is that a
hedge fund is solely an investment device where wealthy and well-informed
investors, willing to take substantial financial risks, invest their assets in order to
realize above market average returns. Therefore, the argument goes, increased
regulation over this industry would result in "harming investor return[s] by in-
creasing [regulation] costs and limiting the ability [of the investor] to select an
investment that matches [their] tolerance for risk."1 25 Critics argue that because
of the inherent characteristics encompassing the investors that make up the "pri-
vate investment pool" in a hedge fund, SEC regulation is neither needed nor
desired. 126 In essence, the argument is that the purpose of the securities laws
and the SEC is only to provide protection, via full disclosure of all material in-
formation necessary for the investor to make an informed decision of whether or
not to invest, to those investors who can not protect themselves. 27 Thus, as-
suming hedge fund investors are wise enough to invest prudently in a hedge
fund because of their high level of wealth and supposed financial sophistication,
the critics of the "hedge fund rule" argue that the role of the SEC in regulating
hedge funds should be limited to a de minimis reminder of caveat emptor-
investors of a hedge fund do so at their own risk.
21
125 Id. at 1578-79.
126 See Preiserowicz, supra note 20, at 808 (arguing that the SEC's hedge fund rule is a "purely
political move [by the SEC] that plays off the public's fear of another Enron and threatens to
obstruct a useful investment tool of the wealthy, as well as damage... [the use of hedge funds as
a] useful market efficiency tool.") (quotations omitted). See also Troy A. Paredes, Insights From
the SEC's Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds, 31 SPG ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS. 12, 12-14 (2006)
(arguing that the SEC is taking a proactive and precautionary approach in unnecessarily regulating
hedge funds as a result of the criticisms that SEC received in wake of its failure to prevent the
Enron and WorldCom disasters).
127 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (stating that the Congressional
purpose of the Securities Act was "to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of informa-
tion thought necessary to informed investment decisions").
128 For a recap of the concerns that the SEC has with the wholly unregulated hedge fund indus-
try, see supra Part III (A) & (B). Whether the SEC should have increased regulation over the
hedge fund industry is a question of balancing two very different concerns: investor and market
protection via increased regulation vs. the possible detrimental effects that regulation will have on
the hedge fund industry without any tangible assurances that such regulation will actually benefit
the same.
On the one hand, increased disclosure is generally healthy for investors, markets, and
regulators .... Further, the burden of registration [under the IAA] on hedge fund ad-
visers seems very light .... On the other hand, the tangible benefit that registration
provides is not readily apparent .... [I]t is not obvious that increased hedge fund dis-
closure to the SEC and to the public would decrease incidences of fraud or of finan-
cial collapse. Further,.. . the SEC will [have] ... little manpower and other resources
to begin reviewing and investigating ... [the hedge fund] industry.
O'Halloran, supra note 44, at 487-88.
23
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Critics do, however, understand that the "[hedge fund] industry has got-
ten too big to be [totally] unregulated[,]' ' 2 9 and they have put forth several al-
ternatives to the SEC's "hedge fund rule." First, most agree that:
some type of "[1]imit[ed] regulation is ... necessary to require
hedge funds . . . to disclose comprehensive information about
their trading strategies, exposures, and positions .... Without
such disclosures, hedge funds can assume very large, risky posi-
tions by acquiring excessive leverage, possibly significantly
impacting [the U.S.] financial markets without the foreknowl-
edge of [the SEC].
130
Furthermore, some have recommended that the SEC only require cer-
tain hedge funds to register under the IAA, such as those hedge funds that have
an investor base comprised of other registered investment vehicles (pension
funds, funds of hedge funds, etc.).131 Others suggest that the SEC should require
all hedge fund advisers who utilize the IAA's private adviser exemption to sub-
mit the fund's financial data and other management information to the SEC in
lieu of requiring full-blown registration under the IAA.132 Finally, one critic
recommended that the SEC should have adopted a "default rule" of hedge fund
adviser registration under the IAA that could be opted out of by the adviser
upon making formal disclosures to the fund's investors of why the adviser be-
lieved registration was not in the best interests of the hedge fund or its individ-
ual investors.
33
Nevertheless, the SEC promulgated the "hedge fund rule" in what they
believed was an effective means of dealing with the explosive growth of the
hedge fund industry, potential "retailization," and a marked increase in fraud.
34
It would be only a short time after hedge fund advisers were required to register,
February 1, 2006, before the critics challenged the SEC's legal authority to im-
plement its new rule. With these challenges the question turned to whether the
SEC's "hedge fund rule" could withstand judicial scrutiny under the IAA. In
June of 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ("the
Court") held that it could not.1
3 5
129 Susan L. Barreto, U.S. Court Strikes Down SEC Hedge Fund Rule, HEDGEWORLD DAILY
NEWS, June 23, 2006.
130 Gibson, supra note 7, at 715.
131 Greupner, supra note 34, at 1592-93.
132 Preiserowicz, supra note 20, at 44.
133 Paredes, supra note 126, at 13.
134 See supra Part 1II.B.
135 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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IV. GOLDSTEIN V. SEC -THE UNANIMOUS DECISION TO VACATE THE SEC's
"HEDGE FUND RULE"
Phillip Goldstein was the co-owner of the investment advisory firm of
Kimball & Winthrop.' 36 His advisory firm was the general partner and invest-
ment adviser of a hedge fund called Opportunity Partners, L.P. ("O.P.").
137
Goldstein, O.P.'s investment adviser, had previously been exempt from register-
ing with the SEC under the IAA because of the private adviser exemption; how-
ever, as a result of the SEC's "hedge fund rule," Goldstein would have to regis-
ter O.P. under the IAA because of the SEC's re-defining of how his "clients"
were to be calculated for purposes of the exemption. 138 As a result of this re-
quired registration, Goldstein brought suit against the SEC challenging their
legal authority to promulgate the "hedge fund rule." He argued, as did the dis-
senting SEC Commissioners who voted against the "hedge fund rule," that the
SEC misinterpreted how an adviser's clients should be determined under the
private adviser exemption of the IAA. 13 9 The SEC responded that it had the
authority to interpret the word "client" under the LAA because the statute was
"ambiguous as to a method for counting [a hedge fund adviser's clients].'
14
Thus, the validity of the SEC's new "hedge fund rule" would turn on whether
the SEC's new interpretation of a hedge fund adviser's "client" was contrary to
the clear Congressional meaning of "client" under the IAA. In a unanimous
holding, the Court held that it was indeed contrary to Congress's intent and va-
cated the SEC's "hedge fund rule" as being an unreasonable interpretation of the
term "client" under the IAA that "comes close to violating the plain language of
the [Act]."14'
The prime issue addressed by the Court was who should be the hedge
fund adviser's "client" for purposes of the IAA's private adviser exemption.
The Court noted that the IAA did define an investment adviser as "any person
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either di-
rectly or through publications or writings as to the value of securities or as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities."'' 42 The Court de-
termined that it was the directness of the adviser's financial advice that should
be looked at when determining who the adviser's "clients" were. If the adviser
is not giving advice to an investor directly, then the investor should not be con-
136 Id. at 874.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 878.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 880-81 (the SEC's interpretation of a hedge fund adviser's "clients" under the new
"hedge fund rule" "falls outside the bounds of reasonableness." The SEC's construction of the
IAA "cannot survive judicial review" because the "hedge fund rule" "reflects an action that ex-
ceeds the [SEC's statutory] authority."). Id.
142 Id. at 880 (quoting the IAA at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(1 1)) (emphasis added).
25
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sidered the adviser's "client."' 143  Thus, if a hedge fund adviser is not directly
giving investment advice to each individual investor of the hedge fund and,
therefore, the adviser is not the investment adviser of each individual investor,
then "a fortiori each investor cannot be [the] 'client' of that [hedge fund ad-
viser]."'144 The Court then noted that this same reasoning had been used by the
SEC every time it had interpreted a hedge fund adviser's "clients" under the
LAA until its recent promulgation of the "hedge fund rule."'145 Moreover, the
Court reasoned that an individual hedge fund investor is not the "client" of the
hedge fund's adviser because the investor and adviser do not share a
"[f]iduciary, person-to-person relationship" that is "characteristic of the invest-
ment adviser-client relationship."' 46 Given this, the Court opined, the SEC's re-
defining of a hedge fund adviser's "clients" came "close to violating the plain
language of the [IAA]" 14 7 in that it was "counterintuitive [for the SEC] to char-
acterize the investors in a hedge fund as the 'clients' of the adviser"'' 48 because
the hedge fund adviser "owes fiduciary duties only to the [hedge] fund, not to
the [hedgelffund's investors. ,1
49
143 Id. at 879-80. The Court opined:
An investor in a private [hedge] fund may benefit from the adviser's advice (or he may
suffer from it) but he does not receive the advice directly. He invests a portion of his
assets in the [hedge] fund. The fund manager-the adviser--controls the disposition of
the pool of capital in the fund. The adviser does not tell the investor how to spend his
money; the investor made that decision when he invested in the [hedge] fund. Having
bought into the [hedge] fund, the investor fades into the background; his role is com-
pletely passive.
Id.
144 Id. at 880.
145 Id. The Court opined:
As recently as 1997, [the SEC] explained that a "client of an investment adviser typi-
cally is provided with individualized advice that is based on the client's financial situa-
tion and investment objectives. In contrast, the investment adviser of [a hedge fund]..
. need not consider the individual needs of the [hedge fund's] ... shareholders when
making investment decisions, and thus has no obligation to ensure that each security
purchased for the [hedge fund].., is an appropriate investment for each shareholder."
Id. (citation omitted).
146 Id. at 880 (quotations omitted). The existence of an advisory relationship depends on the
character of the advice that the investment adviser gives to the investor. Id An investment advi-
sor gives their "clients" "personalized advice [that is] attuned to [the] client's concerns." Id. Be-
cause a hedge fund adviser does not give the individual investors of the hedge fund such personal-
ized advice, a hedge fund adviser is not the "investment adviser" to each individual hedge fund
investor. "This type of direct relationship exists between the adviser and the [hedge] fund, but not
between the adviser and the investors in the [hedge] fund. The adviser is concerned with the
[hedge] fund's performance, not with each investor's financial condition." Id.
147 Id. at 881.
148 Id.
149 Id. (emphasis added). The Court addresses in depth the fact that a hedge fund adviser and
the individual investors in the hedge fund that the adviser advises are not fiduciaries and, there-
fore, the adviser owes the investor no duty of loyalty. Id. Because the adviser does not have a
[Vol. 110
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Furthermore, the Court held that the SEC's sudden alteration in how it
would count a hedge fund adviser's "clients" made little judicial sense because
"over the years, the advisory relationship between hedge fund advisers and in-
vestors has [not] changed.' 50 The Court noted that:
The Commission cited, as justification for its rule, a rise in the
amount of hedge fund assets, indications that more pension
funds and other institutions were investing in hedge funds, and
an increase in fraud actions involving hedge funds. All of this
may be true, although the dissenting Commissioners doubted it.
But without any evidence that the role of fund advisers with re-
spect to investors had undergone a transformation, there is a
disconnect between the factors the Commission cited and the
rule it promulgated. That the Commission wanted a hook on
which to hang more comprehensive regulation of hedge funds
may be understandable. But the Commission may not accom-
plish its objective by a manipulation of [the clear] meaning of
[who a hedge fund adviser's "clients" are] .... The Commis-
sion has not justified treating all investors in hedge funds as cli-
ents for the purpose of the rule.
151
In the Court's eyes the "hedge fund rule" was completely arbitrary because the
SEC had not satisfactorily justified its new interpretation of a hedge fund ad-
viser's "clients." The Court found that the SEC failed to note any change in the
relationship between the investment adviser and the individual investors of the
hedge fund which would suggest to the SEC that a re-defining of an adviser's
"clients" was necessary. 52 Furthermore, the Court opined that the "hedge fund
rule' s" policy goal of granting the SEC regulatory oversight over an investment
industry that "substantially affect[s] ... [the] national securities exchanges...
and the national economy"'153 improperly reigns in hedge funds and their advis-
ers because "[i]t is the volume of assets under management or the extent of in-
debtedness of a hedge fund ... that determines a [hedge] fund's importance to
duty of loyalty to the individual investor, the adviser is not required to "disclose self-interested
transactions [to the individual investor], ... manage [the individual investor's] portfolios in the
best interests of [the investors], or "fully disclose any material conflicts that adviser has with the
[individual investor]." Id.
150 Id. at 882.
151 Id. (emphasis added). Although the Court uses strong disfavoring language against the
"hedge fund rule," this statement by the Court is important for considering what the future of SEC
hedge fund regulation could entail. The Court did not hold that the SEC's desired "end" of regu-
lating hedge funds was impermissible under the IAA, but rather only that the "hedge fund rule"
was an inappropriate "means" of achieving such increased hedge fund regulation. See generally
id.
152 Id. at 883.
153 Id. (citation omitted).
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national markets, ' 154 not the number of investors that are investing in such a
hedge fund.
155
As a result of what the Court termed as "arbitrary," the "hedge fund
rule" was vacated and the SEC was left virtually powerless to regulate an area
of the U.S. financial markets that continues to grow at an unprecedented pace.
56
V. THE AFTERMATH-FROM GOLDSTE1N TO AMARANTH ADVISORS, WHAT
WILL THE FUTURE OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION ENTAIL?
A. The Response to Goldstein
"It would be an understatement to say that [the Goldstein ruling] ...
was a setback for the SEC.1 57 This sentiment best describes the position the
SEC found itself in after the Goldstein Court struck down its "hedge fund rule"
and, thus, allowed hedge fund advisers to return to their previous method of
counting clients for purposes of the "private adviser exemption" under the IAA.
The Goldstein decision resulted in a "regulatory black hole" 158 to which the SEC
found itself inadequately able to regulate a financial industry whose continuing
growth will have a substantial impact on U.S. financial markets. 159 Nonetheless,
the SEC maintains that it's concerns regarding hedge funds will continue, even
after Goldstein. 160 However, indications that the SEC will remain vigilant in its
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 For an account of the increased growth of the hedge fund industry, see supra notes 6-9 and
accompanying text.
157 Terry Stanton, Hedge Funds Register Surprise over Court Ruling, HEDGEWORLD DAILY
NEWS, June 23, 2006. But see Part III.C. 1 for a discussion of the views of the dissenting SEC
Commissioners who viewed the "hedge fund rule" as the inappropriate "means" for addressing the
problems cited by the majority of the Commissioners as justification for enacting the "hedge fund
rule." Particularly, Commissioner Atkins had voiced concerns that the "hedge fund rule" would
divert the SEC's already thinning resources and oversight away from protecting the everyday
investor of a mutual fund to instead providing unneeded protection to hedge fund investors the
"likes of Warren Buffet and Jimmy Buffet, Michael Dell and Michael Jordan, Bill Marriott and
Paris Hilton." Emma Trincal, Commissioner Atkins Criticizes SEC's Zeal, HEDGEWORLD DAILY
NEws, Jan. 30, 2007. Commissioner Atkins's point is well taken and reiterates the major conten-
tion amongst those for and against the regulation of hedge funds-should the SEC be regulating a
class of investment vehicles (hedge funds) that are privately run, not available to the vast majority
of the investing public, and which are almost entirely invested in by wealthy, well-informed inves-
tors who already have access (debatably) to the type of material information that SEC registration
would otherwise require disclosure of? It is the vast disagreement over this policy question that
will serve as the foundation for any future hedge fund regulation and the arguments in opposition
resulting therefrom. See infra Parts V.C.3 & 4.
158 Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Regulation and Prosecution of Hedge Funds, N.Y.
LAW JOURNAL, Aug. 1, 2006, at 3.
159 Cox Testimony, supra note 6.
160 Id. In his testimony, Chairman Cox noted:
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pursuit of extensive hedge fund regulation appears uncertain, especially after the
SEC, now led by Chairman Cox, announced that it would not appeal the Gold-
stein holding to the United States Supreme Court as a last ditch effort to save its
"hedge fund rule."'
161
Perhaps to the surprise of those who criticized the SEC's now defunct
"hedge fund rule," the largest hedge fund financial collapse in U.S. history
would occur less than two months later when Amaranth Advisors lost $6.5 bil-
lion of its investors' assets on imprudent natural-gas investments and was ulti-
mately forced into a liquidation that left their investors "out of luck" and out of
money. 1
62
B. The Collapse of Amaranth Advisors
Amaranth Advisors, a Connecticut based hedge fund led by Brian
Hunter (Amaranth's energy investment adviser) traded substantially in natural-
gas futures and options contracts and had been successfully producing profits
for its investors for most of 2006.163 In fact, up through the end of August 2006,
Hunter had returned Amaranth and its investors 22% on their energy invest-
ments for the year. 64 However, forecasts for a warm winter caused the volatile
price of natural-gas to sink and those above market returns quickly evaporated
as Amaranth, whose 6,670 trading positions were leveraged out on average four
and a half times,165 lost approximately $5 billion in one week due to untimely
The remarkable pace of hedge fund growth, which we noted at the time [of the promul-
gation of the "hedge fund rule"], has continued unabated. The potential for retail inves-
tors to be harmed by hedge fund risk remains as serious a concern now as then. And
the growth in hedge fund fraud that we have seen accompany the growth in hedge funds
implicates the very basic responsibility of the SEC to protect investors from fraud, un-
fair dealing and market manipulation.
Id. Chairman Cox maintained that hedge funds, even after Goldstein, "are not, should not be, and
will not be unregulated" because hedge fund advisers remain accountable to the hedge funds they
advise under the anti-fraud provisions of the IAA. Id. See infra Parts V.C.2 & 3.
161 Jacob Bunge, SEC v. Goldstein: To Appeal or Not to Appeal, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS,
Aug. 7, 2006.
162 See Anderson, supra note 18.
163 Ann Davis, Blue Flameout: How Giant Bets on Natural Gas Sank Brash Hedge-Fund
Trader, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at Al. Amaranth Advisors was one of the first hedge funds
to trade substantially in energy investments after the collapse of Enron. Id. Amaranth hired
Hunter in 2004 and he quickly began to post above market gains for Amaranth's investors. Id.
164 Henny Sender & Gregory Zuckerman, Street Sleuth: Amaranth Natural-Gas Losses May
Have Far-Reaching Effect, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at C3.
165 See Jenny Anderson, Hedge Fund Sheds Assets in Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at
C1. Amaranth made 6,670 natural gas investments and had a debt-to-asset ration of $4.50 to $1.
Therefore, for every $1 of assets that Amaranth had invested in natural gas, it had invested another
$4.50 of borrowed assets (or debt) - money Amaranth did not have, but rather merely borrowed so
as to increase their "leveraged" position in hopes of making more money contingent on the value
of natural gas increasing.
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purchases of billions of dollars worth of natural-gas option contracts that went
sour when the projected future value of natural-gas plummeted. 166 In all, Ama-
ranth's misguided bets caused the hedge fund to lose about 60% of its net assets
($6.5 billion in investor money) in less than a month. 167 These losses forced
Amaranth to sell off all of its remaining energy holdings and literally "shell-
shock" its investors, 50% of which were "retailed" funds of hedge funds.
168
Amaranth's investors, who were reassured by the hedge fund that it would re-
duce its risks after the initial natural-gas losses were realized, quickly demanded
answers for why the advisers of the fund never fully disclosed how risky their
energy positions really were or how the fund suffered such unimaginable and
almost instantaneous losses. 1
69
Immediately after receiving the news that their hedge fund had suffered
severe losses, many Amaranth investors made redemption requests in hopes of
withdrawing their remaining investments from the fund. 170 However, these re-
quests were met by Amaranth's announcement that it was suspending all re-
demptions for the following two months in order to "enable the Amaranth funds
to generate liquidity for all investors ... with the goal of maximizing the pro-
ceeds of asset dispositions., 17' With this, Amaranth conceded that its losses
were insurmountable and, therefore, it would have to close down.
172
Early considerations of the Amaranth Advisors financial disaster sug-
gest that the hedge fund's implosion will not have a major affect on the U.S.
financial markets, as was the case when Long Term Management Capital's de-
mise "threw [the] global [financial] markets into a severe crisis" due to the fund
being leveraged out 100 times at the time of its impending failure. 73 Despite
166 Davis, supra note 163.
167 Anderson, supra note 18.
168 Anderson, supra note 165. See supra note 92 for a definition of "retailization." Two of
these "retailed" investors were a Massachusetts's state employee pension fund, which had $56
million invested in Amaranth, and a San Diego Retirement Fund, which had over $175 million
invested at the time of Amaranth's losses. Bloomberg News, Citing Mounting Losses, Amaranth




170 Anderson, supra note 18.
171 Id. For a detailed explanation of how Amaranth attempted to minimize its losses so as to
provide this liquidity, see Ann Davis, et al., Amid Amaranth Crisis, Other Players Profited, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at Al.
172 Id.
173 Emma Trincal, Struggling to Survive, Amaranth May Offer Lessons to Learn From,
HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Sept. 20, 2006. Amaranth's collapse does not pose the same risk to
the U.S. financial markets that Long-Term Capital Management's impending losses in 1998 did
because (1) Amaranth's positions were in no way as leveraged as Long-Term's at the time of
Amaranth's collapse-Long-Term was leveraged at 100 to 1 when it collapsed; Amaranth only
4.5 to 1; (2) Long-Term's $4 billion dollar loss in 1998 would have amounted to over a $9 billion
[Vol. 110
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early indications that Amaranth's implosion will not have a major impact on
U.S. financial markets, what is important about Amaranth and its unforeseen
demise is the extent to which Amaranth, and its investment advisers, failed to
make timely disclosures to its investors as to the strategies and risk management
policies that the hedge fund was implementing. It was this lack of disclosure
that prevented Amaranth investors from truly knowing what Amaranth's invest-
ing strategies and positions were. And, it was this lack of proper dissemination
of information that likely prohibited the investors from being able to make an
informed decision on whether to request redemption on their investment (if the
investor believed Amaranth's positions to be too risky) or continue their invest-
ment in Amaranth (if they viewed Amaranth's positions as not posing a substan-
tial risk to their invested assets). Amaranth investors were probably not given a
choice before being notified that the fund's bad natural-gas bets resulted in los-
ing over one-half of all of its investor's assets, in less than one month. 174 Would
the SEC's "hedge fund rule" have prevented the Amaranth collapse and subse-
quent harm to its individual investors? Had the investors of Amaranth had the
information that the "hedge fund rule" would have required their advisers to
disclose to the SEC, those investors may have had a more knowledgeable under-
standing of the hedge fund in which they invested and could have, potentially,
used such information to decide whether or not to remain invested in Amaranth
before the loss was realized. Without access to such valuable information,
many supposedly "sophisticated" investors lost billions of dollars from the sud-
den collapse of Amaranth.
To this Author, the collapse of Amaranth Advisors reinforces the need
for increased hedge fund regulation. The critics of the SEC's "hedge fund rule"
argued that hedge fund investors were sophisticated enough to make well in-
formed decisions of whether or not to invest in an un-regulated hedge fund;
however, Amaranth's sudden collapse suggests otherwise. Amaranth lost $6.5
billion of its investor's assets in one month. That amounts to losses of over
$216 million per day. And, the investors of Amaranth did not even have the
opportunity to protect their investment once the fund's advisers informed them
of the impending huge losses to the fund because the fund blocked all redemp-
tion requests for a period of two months. So, for all intents and purposes, Ama-
ranth's "sophisticated" investors had no real meaningful financial protection.
The only thing they could do was sit back and hope that after the fund liquidated
they would get some of their investment back. This scenario suggests the need
for hedge fund regulation to protect those that choose to invest in such funds,
regardless of what level of "sophistication" the law assumes in an investor based
on his or her net-worth. This Author concedes that Amaranth's collapse, im-
pacted in part because of its relatively small use of leverage, will not burden the
dollar loss today, and (3) Long-Term was one of the biggest hedge funds when it collapsed in
1998; whereas, Amaranth was not even in the top 30 biggest funds when it collapsed in 2006. Id.
174 See Anderson, supra note 18.
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U.S. financial markets to the extent that Long Term Capital Management's loss
did in 1998; however, Amaranth's effect will substantially burden its investors
who were blind-sided by the funds collapse and, unfortunately, lost over one-
half of their investments without even having the luxury of a heads-up from
Amaranth's advisers. Because Goldstein struck down the SEC's "hedge fund
rule," Amaranth's advisers may not have had an affirmative duty under the IAA
to disclose the risky positions that its energy traders were engaging in; however,
this Author believes that had such information been disclosed to Amaranth's
investors, they would have at least been given the opportunity to decide for
themselves whether they wanted their assets invested in such volatile natural-
gas positions. Without such opportunity it is clear that Amaranth's investors
were treated unjustly, regardless of their supposed investing "intellect." Be-
cause Amaranth's advisers did not have to register the hedge fund under the
IAA, Amaranth's investors were not afforded the same protection (via manda-
tory disclosure requirements) that the SEC would have provided to other inves-
tors choosing to invest in other investment vehicles required to be registered
under the IAA.
C. The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: Recommendations Presented af-
ter Goldstein and Amaranth
After over two years of investigating the impact that hedge fund growth
had on the U.S. financial markets, 75 the SEC promulgated its "hedge fund rule"
in 2004 to require hedge fund advisers to register under the IAA. 176 Then, less
than six months after the SEC's "hedge fund rule" took effect, the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously vacated the rule in Goldstein
v. SEC as being an arbitrary and unreasonable extension of the SEC's regulatory
authority under the LAA. 177 Afterwards, the SEC sealed the fate of its deceased
"hedge fund rule" when it announced that it would not appeal Goldstein to the
Supreme Court. And, shortly thereafter, the SEC received notification that a
marginally leveraged hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors, had suffered the worst
financial "meltdown" in the history of the U.S. hedge fund industry when it lost
over $6 billion of its investor's assets in less than one month, forcing it into an
unexpected liquidation. 178 In light of this history, it becomes vital to consider
what the SEC's next move should be when considering whether or not to at-
tempt to regulate the hedge fund industry. 179 And, since Goldstein and Ama-
175 See supra note 24.
176 See supra note 12.
177 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). See supra Part IV.
178 See Anderson, supra note 18.
179 Hedge fund regulation is, and should remain, a top priority of the SEC. The same concerns
addressed in the SEC's Staff Report and "hedge fund rule" remain unsolved. See Cox Testimony,
supra note 6. The number of hedge funds continues to grow at remarkable rates and, nonetheless,
the SEC continues to have a genuinely inadequate quantity of information about them. Id. The
[Vol. 110
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ranth, there have been a plethora of recommendations made throughout the po-
litical spectrum and the investing industry regarding what type of increased
hedge fund regulation, if any, is desirable.
1. Hedge Funds say "Regulate Thyself'
In light of the sparked interest surrounding the extent to which hedge
funds should be increasingly regulated, the industry itself has proposed the crea-
tion of a self-regulatory organization, similar to that of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, in an effort to avoid further SEC oversight over the indus-
try.180 This hedge fund "self-policing" initiative was originally proposed in the
wake of the Long-Term Capital Management debacle in 1998, and it has re-
ceived attention once again as a result of the recent liquidation of Amaranth
Advisors. 181 In essence, this proposed association would establish certain dis-
closure standards that hedge fund advisers must adhere to, and it would have the
authority to penalize those advisers which fail to comply with such disclosure.
However, this proposal has not been universally considered throughout the
hedge fund community and, therefore, is nowhere close to becoming a regula-
tory reality.
182
2. Congress Weighs In
On September 27, 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
"Hedge Fund Study Act,"' 83 requiring the President's Working Group on Fi-
nancial Markets to once again conduct a study on the hedge fund industry and
its effects on both the U.S. financial markets and its investors.1 84 This Act
sought recommendations from the President's Working Group in three areas:
amount of assets that hedge fund advisers control is well over $1 trillion. Id. "Retailization" of
institutional investors, including pension plans and funds of funds, remains a valid, although po-
tentially unrealized, issue to be considered. Id. As hedge funds have grown in size, so to have the
number of instances of fraud associated with their advisers. Id. Finally, hedge fund investors
generally remain insufficiently knowledgeable as to the investment positions and risks being
implemented by the advisers of the hedge funds in which they invest.
180 David Enrich & Arden Dale, Hedge Funds, Regulate Thyself--Could Self-Policing Help
Avoid More Government Oversight? WALL. ST. J., Oct. 4, 2006, at B4.
181 Id.
182 Id. Many questions remain as to the feasibility of this hedge fund self-policing organiza-
tion, including: (1) how much hedge fund adviser approval is needed before such a plan is imple-
mented, (2) what extent should this association be able to enforce hedge fund advisers to disclose
information, and (3) is the hedge fund industry even capable of regulating itself, or should the task
of regulation remain with the SEC? Id.
183 H.R. 6079, 109th Cong. (2006).
184 Christopher Faille, Political Reflex; Order Up a Study, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Sept.
29, 2006. For a description of the President's Working Group unfortunate finding that the future
of hedge fund regulation should be "hands off," see infra Part VI.
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(1) proposed legislation relating to appropriate disclosure requirements, (2) what
information should such disclosures include, and (3) what potential oversight
responsibilities should the President's Working Group have over the hedge fund
industry.
85
On February 22, 2007, the President's Working Group, upon this con-
gressional request, published its findings on the need for increased hedge fund
regulation. 186  Sadly, the President's Working Group's conclusions can be
summed up as: due to recent increases in market discipline (interestingly un-
elaborated on), the SEC should not require the hedge fund industry to make
greater disclosures to potential and current hedge fund investors because these
investors are savvy enough to demand the sort of information that they need
before investing in a hedge fund and, therefore, hedge funds will freely disclose
such material financial information for fear of losing potential investment capi-
tal.187 To this Author, this imprudent approach seems circular and representa-
tive of the status quo assumption that hedge fund investors can protect them-
selves to the same degree that the SEC protects the investors of other registered
investment vehicles. 88 This is simply not the case. Yes, hedge fund investors
are "sophisticated" in the sense that they meet certain arbitrary net-worth re-
quirements; however, to say that all of these investors (comprised to a decipher-
able extent of the newly rich and other "retailized" investment funds) can fend
for themselves is a fallacy. Yes, a large portion of hedge fund investors are
business savvy and well versed in investing in the high risk, volatile markets
that most hedge funds invest their "clients"' assets in. However, not all hedge
fund investors meet this minimum threshold. Not all hedge fund investors have
the level of expertise or investing prowess to demand that their hedge fund ad-
visers disclose all pertinent financial information about the hedge fund that they
are about to invest in, or continue investing in. And, because of this fact alone,
meaningful measures must be taken to ensure that all hedge fund investors are
185 Id. In Goldstein, the D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC's "hedge fund rule" under the IAA;
however, Congress may still enact its own amendment to the IAA to require hedge fund advisers
to register. But, it is worth noting that the hedge fund industry would likely concede regulatory
authority to the SEC before Congress stepped in, via an amendment to the IAA, because many
hedge fund advisers fear that such Congressional legislation could be modeled after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which was passed by Congress in response to the corporate scandals of Enron, World-
Com, etc. See Bunge, supra note 161.
186 Debra Solomon, Regulators' Hedge-Fund Approach: Hands Off, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2007, at Cl. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
187 Id. See SEC Proposed Rule 509, 216, infra note 202. However, the President's Working
Group did not give the same recommendation for the SEC's new anti-fraud rules. See SEC Pro-
posed Rule 206(4)-8, infra note 202, and Part V.C.3.
188 As the financial meltdown of Amaranth Advisors should clearly suggest, a de minimis re-
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as fully protected as their investing counterparts in other registered investment
vehicles.
Only months after the President's Working Group put forth its recom-
mendation for "hands-off' hedge fund regulation, far-reaching tax legislation
was introduced in both houses of Congress to regulate hedge fund advisers
where it hurts-their pocket books. On June 14, 2007, the ranking members of
the Senate Finance Committee in the U.S. Senate 89 introduced S. 1624;19° legis-
lation to characterize a publicly traded hedge fund's adviser's management fees,
which historically have been characterized as a capital asset' 91 and taxed at a
15% rate under the Internal Revenue Code (the "LRC"), 192 as ordinary corporate
income1 93 and taxed at rate as high as 35%.194 And, S. 1624 will impose this tax
increase on all advisers who advise publicly traded hedge funds, regardless of
whether or not the adviser is registered under the IAA. Furthermore, only eight
days after S. 1624 was introduced in the Senate, the U.S. House of Representa-
tive, on June 22, 2007, introduced their own legislation, H.R. 2834, to expand S.
1624's proposed tax increases to all hedge fund advisers, regardless of whether
or not the hedge fund that the advisers managed was publicly traded. 195 Specifi-
cally, H.R. 2834 will amend the IRC to re-characterize the net income earned by
all hedge fund advisers as ordinary corporate income for purposes of imposing
taxes thereto. 1
96
189 The Honorable Max Baucus (D-MT) and The Honorable Charles Grassley (R-IA). It is
worth noting that unlike many economic political issues, hedge fund regulation has not divided
Congress down traditional partisan lines (with Democrats being for and Republicans being against
increased hedge fund regulation). Emma Trincal, Election Day and Hedge Funds: A Lipper
HedgeWorld Preview, HEDGEWoRLD DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2006.
190 S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007). S. 1624 will amend § 7704(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
(the "IRC") to re-classify publicly traded hedge funds, which historically have been organized
under the federal securities laws as limited liability partnerships, as corporations for purposes of
imposing taxes on the income that such advisers generate. Id.
191 See 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (2006) (defining "capital asset").
192 See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2006) (setting forth the maximum federal tax rates for capital gains).
193 Proponents of this reclassification argue that the fees hedge fund advisers receive should be
classified as ordinary income because hedge fund advisers receive such fees as compensation for
their investment management advice and, therefore, these fees should not represent a gain on
"capital." See Close Hedge Fund Loophole, BOSTON HERALD (Online Edition), July 29, 2007,
http://www.bostonherald.com/news/opinion/editorial/view.bg?articleid=1013919&srvc=hom.
194 See Stephen Grocer, Trading Shots: Taxing Private Equity, WALL ST. J. (Online Edition),
July 24, 2007, http://newsuchicago.edu/citations/07/070724.kaplan-wsj.html. If enacted into law,
S. 1624 would increase the amount of taxes that hedge fund advisers would have to pay on their
performance fees by as much as $6 billion. Jenny Anderson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Congress
Weighs End to Private Equity Tax Break, THE NEW YORK TIMEs, June 21, 2007, at Al. It must
be noted that, although outside the scope of debate for purposes of this Note, the Congressional
determination to reclassify hedge fund adviser management fees as ordinary income instead of a
capital asset is debatable.
195 H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007).
196 Id. Whether hedge fund advisers' performance fees should be re-classified as ordinary
income instead of capital gains brings up issues of tax law that are outside the scope of this Note;
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This legislation, if enacted, may have a marked impact on the hedge
fund industry. Hedge fund advisers, accustomed to paying very little by way of
taxes on the millions of dollars that they earn every year due to their investing
"expertise, ' ' 197 would now be forced to cough up a much higher percentage of
their annual income back to Uncle Sam. However, there are many questions
remaining as to the efficiency of these congressional proposals for "monetary
sacrifice" from hedge fund advisers. Will monetarily penalizing hedge fund
advisers protect hedge fund investors and the funds that they choose to invest?
Probably not. Will having to pay heavier taxes on their performance fees en-
courage hedge fund advisers to provide the type of disclosure and transparency
that registering under with the SEC would otherwise require? It is doubtful.
198
And, as some early critics of S. 1624 and H.R. 2834 have suggested, such in-
creased tax burdens may cause many hedge fund advisers to flea the U.S. finan-
cial markets and relocate their hedge funds abroad. 199 Thus, it remains to be
seen whether or not S. 1624 and H.R. 2834 can serve as suitable hedge fund
regulation. However, one thing is for certain, with its introduction of S. 1624
and H.R. 2834, Congress has brought hedge funds back into the regulatory spot-
light,2 ° regardless of whether or not a hedge fund adviser has to register under
the IAA in the wake of Goldstein.2°'
however, it is worth noting that some tax scholars have already disapproved of these congres-
sional proposals on the grounds that hedge fund advisers should have their "earnings" taxed in the
same fashion as those profits earned by the investors in such advisers' hedge funds, as a capital
gain resulting from their limited partnership interest in the fund. See David Weisbach, Professor
Says Carried Interest Legislation is Misguided, 116 TAx NoTEs 505, Aug. 6, 2007.
197 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. See supra notes 189-194 and accompanying text.
198 See Jackie Calmes, Hedge Funds Aren't Worried About Possible Tax Increases, WALL ST. J.
(Online Edition), Aug. 10, 2007, http:/public.cq.comldocs/cqtlnewslIO-000002554713.html (a
survey of 400 hedge funds found that most do not fear Congress's proposed tax increases). And,
without such fear instilled in hedge fund advisers, these congressional proposals may not result in
increased disclosure or transparency from the adviser to the investor.
199 In his July, 2007 testimony before the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke opined that Congress's proposed
tax increases will not affect the investment activities of hedge fund advisers, but may affect the
location of where such activities take place. See Michael Crittenden, Bernanke Says Higher Taxes
Could Drive Equity Firms, Hedge Funds Abroad, CQ Today (Online Edition), July 19, 2007,
http://public.cq.com/docs/cqt/newslI0-000002554713.html. To this Author, it is unlikely that
Chairman Bernanke's premonition will become a reality because, at the end of the day, hedge
fund advisers' operations in the U.S. financial markets remain wholly unregulated and their an-
nual earnings continue to grow at a staggering pace. Simply, these Congressional proposed tax
increases will not effectively reduce a hedge fund adviser's incentive to remain in the United
States.
200 Opponents of S. 1624 and H.R. 2834 would argue, however, that this congressional legisla-
tion has nothing to do with protecting hedge fund investors and the U.S. financial markets, but
rather amounts to nothing more than revenue generating activities stemming from equity princi-
ples of tax allocation (i.e., hedge fund advisers can afford to be taxed at higher, non-capital, rates
and, therefore, they should be so taxed).
201 See supra Part IV.
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3. The SEC's most recent go-around: The "Prohibition of Fraud
by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles." Will this
new SEC Rule protect hedge fund investors sufficiently?
The final development, which serves as the launching point for this
Note's concluding evaluation, comes from a newly enacted SEC rule under the
IAA, the "Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehi-
cles" (the "SEC's New Rule"). 20 2 This Rule will extend the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the IAA (which currently only prohibit the hedge fund adviser from
202 Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-8766, (August 3, 2007) [hereinafter SEC's New Rule] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(4)-8 et seq.). The SEC's Rule is based on its authority to adopt rules under the anti-
fraud provisions of § 80b-6(4) of the IAA. Id. at 6. Furthermore, in December of 2006, the SEC
also proposed two new rules (Rule 509 and Rule 216) under the Securities Act, which would cut
the number of individual investors eligible to invest in hedge funds by raising the "accredited
investor" requirement from anyone owning at least $1 million in investments to anyone owning at
least $2.5 million in investments. Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8766, at 19 (Dec. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.216
et seq.). See supra note 27 for an explanation of "accredited investor" and how hedge funds es-
cape SEC regulation under the Securities Act. By raising the "accredited investor" level under the
Securities Act, hedge funds will not be able to avoid SEC regulation if their advisers allow inves-
tors with less than a $2.5 million net-worth to invest in the hedge fund. Some believe that these
rules "could reduce the number of qualified [hedge fund] investors by [as much as] 88%." Kara
Scannell, SEC to Investors: More Internet, Less Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2006, at C1.
This reduction in qualified investors will hopefully lessen one of the SEC's major concerns-the
investment sophistication of many hedge fund investors are not high enough to ensure that these
investors will make rational, well-informed investment decisions without additional SEC protec-
tion. Under the Securities Act, an investor is presumed to be sophisticated if he or she meets this
level of "accreditation;" however, courts have warned that potential investors deemed to be so-
phisticated still require the protection that mandatory disclosure would provide (unrestricted ac-
cess to the material information of the hedge fund's adviser). See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953) (holding that issuers of securities should not be exempt from the registra-
tion requirements of the Securities Act unless the issuers' investors do not need the protection that
the Act provides-full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment deci-
sions); Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that
"sophistication is not a substitute for access to the information that registration [under the Securi-
ties Act] would disclose). See also Jacob Bunge, SEC, Pitt and Others Weigh Hedge Fund Rules,
HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Feb. 23, 2007 ("Being wealthy doesn't equate to increased investor
knowledge... [or the] ability to ascertain a good/bad investment .. ").
However, at the time of this Article's publication, the SEC has not approved Proposed Rules 509
and 216. Principally, the entirety of the criticisms received by the SEC during the public com-
ment period for Rules 509 and 216 were from hedge fund investors who currently qualified as
"accredited investors," but who would lose such qualification and be forced to withdraw their
hedge fund investments due to the Proposed Rules' increased net-worth requirements. See Ac-
credited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Comments on Proposed Rule:
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in
Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8766.
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defrauding his or her "clients"-the hedge fund itself)20 3 to protect the actual
individual investors of a hedge fund by creating a "new... 'look-through' [in]
the organizational form of a hedge fund adviser's clients" 2°4 for purposes of the
anti-fraud provisions of the IAA. 20 5 It is the SEC's position that this new look-
through will "[strengthen] protections for investors2°6 against hedge fund advis-
ers who commit "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" 207 acts against those
individuals who invest in the hedge funds under the adviser's management.
As stated, the SEC adopted its new rule in hopes of protecting individ-
ual hedge fund investors against the fraudulent and deceptive acts of the hedge
fund's advisers.20 8 This Rule came in response to the Goldstein decision, which
"created uncertainties regarding [the] obligations that investment advisers to
[hedge funds] .. .have to the [hedge funds'] .. .investors. ' 2°  The Goldstein
decision clearly opined that the hedge fund itself was the adviser's client for
IAA purposes; therefore, Section 80b-6(l) and (2) of the IAA, which clearly
prohibit fraudulent practices by an adviser to the hedge fund's "clients," would
not provide such protection for the hedge fund's individual investors. 210 How-
ever, the Goldstein decision did not have the same effect on the SEC's anti-
fraud regulatory powers under Section 80b-6(4) of the IAA because that Section
does not only prohibit advisers from engaging in fraud against their "clients,"
but rather more broadly prohibits the adviser from engaging in any fraudulent
act or practice, regardless of who such act or practice is directed towards. 21 I
Furthermore, Section 80b-6(4) expressly grants the SEC the power to adopt
rules and regulations to specifically prevent the adviser from engaging in any
fraudulent act or practice.212 Therefore, the SEC's New Rule would extend the
anti-fraud provisions of Section 80b-6(4) of the IAA to protect the individual
investors of a hedge fund.213
203 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-6 (2006).
204 Christopher Faille, Cox Wants Fiduciary Look-Through Rule, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS,
July 25, 2006.
205 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-6(4) (2006).
206 SEC's New Rule, supra note 202, at 3.
207 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-6(4) (2006).
208 See SEC New Rule, supra note 202.
209 Id. at6.
210 Id.
211 Id. Therefore, the SEC believes that its new rule under § 80b-6(4) would "clarify that the
SEC is authorised to take action against investment advisers to hedge funds ... who mislead or
defraud investors, whether or not the advisers are registered with the SEC [under the IAA]." SEC
to Strengthen Rules on Hedge Fund Fraud and Qualifying Investors, HEDGEWEEK, Dec.15, 2006.
212 SEC's New Rule, supra note 202.
213 Believing that the Goldstein decision had many negative "side-effects" on the individual
investors of hedge funds, deemed by Goldstein not to be the "clients" of the hedge fund's adviser
for purposes of financial disclosure under the IAA, the SEC believes that its New Rule will enable
the Commission to "fulfill its mission of investor protection" through the IAA's anti-fraud provi-
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Under Section 80b-6(4) of the IAA specifically:
it would constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act,
practice, or course of business.., for any investment adviser to
a [hedge fund] to make any untrue statement of a material fact
to any investor or prospective investor in the [hedge fund], or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made to any investor or prospective investor in the
[hedge fund], in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.214
Furthermore, the Rule will prohibit a hedge fund's adviser from "otherwise en-
gag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the
[hedge fund]., 215 Thus, all hedge fund advisers would be prohibited from mak-
ing false or misleading statements, or otherwise engaging in any deceptive con-
duct, to the individual investors (or potential investors) of the advisers' hedge
fund.216 And, the SEC would be able to bring enforcement actions under the
IAA against a hedge fund adviser who disseminates such false statements or
engages in such fraudulent or deceptive conduct,217 even if such fraud or decep-
tion is not aimed at the fund's investors directly.
21 8
This New Rule amounts to another attempt by the SEC to rein in the
wholly unregulated hedge fund industry; however, the question remains: assum-
ing the New Rule does not meet the same fate as the SEC's previous "hedge
fund rule," will it provide hedge fund investors (or potential investors) with the
same meaningful protection that the SEC and the federal securities laws guaran-
tees to the greater investing public? 219 Unfortunately, this Author believes that
sions. Chris Clair, SEC Proposes New Hedge Fund Rules, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Dec. 15,
2006. However, the question will remain: will this anti-fraud extension guarantee that individual
hedge fund investors will have access to all material financial information for which they need to
make qualified investment decisions, or does the SEC's New Rule only prevent something (fraud)
which, at least in theory, makes no assurances that more financial information will be disclosed to
individual hedge fund investors?
214 SEC's New Rule, supra note 202, at 11-12.
215 Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
216 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). As stated, this New Rule would apply to all hedge fund advisers.
Therefore, a hedge fund adviser exempted from SEC regulation under the IAA's private adviser
exemption would nonetheless be required to comply with the IAA's anti-fraud provisions in §
206b-6(4) and the SEC's New Rule.
217 Id. at 40.
218 See Clair, supra note 213.
219 The "protection" that other, non-hedge fund, investors receive under the IAA principally
derives from the information that SEC registration under the IAA requires an investment adviser
to disclose, which in turn becomes public information and guarantees that those investors (or
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this question will ultimately be answered in the negative. The SEC's New Rule
may guarantee that a hedge fund adviser has a fiduciary duty220 not to "engage
in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or ma-
nipulative [to clients or perspective clients];,, 221 however, this requirement falls
short of the blanket disclosure of information that hedge fund investors would
have had access to as a result of the adviser being required to register their
hedge fund with the SEC.222 Thus, the SEC's New Rule will only provide
hedge fund investors with the same anti-fraud protection that the Commission
already provides other investors in the U.S. financial markets after the investor
chooses to invest (or is considering to invest) in the hedge fund under the ad-
viser's management. The Rule does not impose an affirmative duty on the
hedge fund adviser to disclose material financial information about the hedge
fund itself. Therefore, a potential hedge fund investor will not be protected to
the same extent as other non-hedge fund investors because these potential inves-
tors will simply not have access to the same type of information about the in-
vestment vehicle they are contemplating investing in. And, without such access,
there is simply no way that the SEC will be able to protect hedge fund investors
to the extent that other financial investors are duly protected. 23 Therefore, to
this Author, the SEC's New Rule falls short of fulfilling the purpose of the SEC
and the federal securities laws-ensuring investor protection through disclosure
potential investors) of the adviser have access to such information before deciding to invest (or to
continue to invest) with the adviser. See supra note 60.
220 The anti-fraud provisions of the IAA "were intended to establish federal fiduciary standards
to govern conduct of... advisers .... and [the] investment adviser has [an] affirmative duty of
utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material facts." SEC v. Financial News Asso-
ciates, 1985 W.L. 25023 (E.D. Va. 1985).
221 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (2006).
222 See supra note 63. It is access to this blanket financial information that the SEC's previous
"hedge fund rule" would have required, and that the decision in Goldstein struck down as arbi-
trary.
223 This Author realizes that the opponents of increased hedge fund regulation argue that the
vast majority of hedge fund investors are wealthy and highly sophisticated and, therefore, will
have access to the financial information they need without SEC registration; however, as is evi-
dent in the Amaranth Adviser's "meltdown," it is clear that many allegedly "sophisticated" inves-
tors simply do not have as much access to such information as many opponents believe. Gone are
the days where only experienced, wealthy, business savvy investors are investing in hedge funds.
Hedge fund investors, to some extent, are now classified as newly-rich, financially unsophisti-
cated investors trying to take quick advantage of the lucrative, absolute profit for which hedge
fund advisers claim as the "selling point" for investing in these highly volatile and risky invest-
ments. However, as Amaranth may have made apparent, these investors are investing in hedge
funds without having access to the same information they would have had if they had chosen to
invest in another IAA registered investment vehicle, such as a mutual fund. And, it is this Au-
thor's contention that such "restricted" access to the financial information of a hedge fund will
ultimately cause more financial harm to the fund's investors than cost to the hedge fund had its
adviser been otherwise required to register under the IAA and make public disclosures to the SEC.
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of all financial information relating to the investment vehicle for which the in-
vestor is contemplating investing in. 24
VI. CONCLUSION
"When the tide goes out, you find out who is naked.,
225
The future of hedge fund regulation is, unfortunately, uncertain. Since
Goldstein2 6 and the unexpected collapse of Amaranth Advisors, 2 7 there has
been no consensus as to whether, or to what extent, hedge funds, and hedge fund
advisers, should be federally regulated. And, it remains to be seen what impact
the most recent regulatory attempts-Congress's proposed tax increases 228 and
the SEC's New Rule229 -will have on the hedge fund industry. However, two
things are certain: (1) the hedge fund industry continues to grow at an unprece-
dented pace 230 and (2) hedge fund investors continue to be the victims of hedge
fund abuses.2 31 And, because these reoccurring abuses could have potentially
224 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953) (holding that "the design of...
[SEC registration] is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions").
225 Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Are Not Profiting From Market's Current Volatility, THE
N.Y. TIMES (Online Edition), Aug. 3, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/
business/03insider.html?ex=1186718400&en=607ac034263fa259&ei=5070&emc=eta (quoting
the great Warren E. Buffett, CEO and controlling shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway).
226 See supra Part IV.
227 See supra Part V.B.
228 See supra Part V.C.2.
229 See supra Part V.C.3.
230 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. But see Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, Grantham
Says Hedge Funds, LBO Funds to Collapse, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Online Edition), July 31, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aov5lqQwu2pE&refer= (stating that
more than one-half of U.S. hedge funds could close in the next five years due to the impending
collapse of the home mortgage market).
231 Two such notable abuses occurred during the Summer of 2007 with the drastic losses suf-
fered by Sowood Capital Managemnet LP, a Boston based hedge fund that lost approximately
$1.5 billion of its investors assets (of which at least $280 million of which were investments from
pension funds and universities) during the month of July on brash bets in the credit market, and
the bankruptcy and liquidation of two large hedge funds managed by The Bear Stearns Co., Inc.
after such funds suddenly lost over $1 billion of its investors' assets as a result of the unexpected
meltdown of subprime mortgage-related securities for which the funds invested principally in.
For a description of the losses suffered by Sowood Capital, see Ross Kerber, Pension Officials in
State Defend Hedge Funds Despite Sowood Loss," THE BOSTON GLOBE (Online Edition), Aug. 3,
2007,http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2007/08/03/pension officials in statedefen
d_hedge funds/. For the same regarding Bear Steams, see Jeff St. Onge & Bill Rochelle, Bear
Stearns Caymans Filing May Hurt Bankrupt Funds' Creditors, Bloomberg News, Aug. 7, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aX9aWxCf9y3o&refer-home; Kevin
Hall and Robert Rankin, Hedge Funds Worrisome to Many Experts, Detroit Free Press (Online
Edition), Aug. 8, 2007.
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been prevented had proper regulatory oversight been established, it is the con-
clusionary opinion of this Author that the future of hedge fund regulation must
be marked by a substantial increase in the amount of protection the federal gov-
ernment (namely the SEC) ensures to those investors who wish to invest their
assets in the hedge fund industry. Without such protection, it is obvious that
hedge fund investors, regardless of their level of investing prowess or expertise,
will remain "naked" in the ever-growing tide that is the hedge fund industry.
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